

THE EXPOSITORY TIMES.

Notes of Recent Exposition.

CRITICS of Barthianism have long felt that this challenging movement in modern theology is in danger of 'gradually falling a prey to a kind of spiritual conservatism which may lead to obscurantism.' Emil Brunner is keenly alive to this peril, and in Miss Olive Wyon's excellent translation of his great work, *The Mediator: A Study of the Central Doctrine of the Christian Faith* (Lutterworth Press; 20s. net), those who do not read German are given the opportunity of seeing how far he is able to avert such a catastrophe. This, of course, is not Dr. Brunner's motive for writing the book. On the contrary, he is as convinced as ever that the Word of God which comes to us as a challenge in Jesus Christ, the Mediator, can be met only by a faith which 'breaks through the intellectual process, and asserts that eternal truth is bound up with an event which took place in time.' None the less he shows a welcome tendency to grapple with some of the intellectual difficulties inherent in the Theology of Crisis, and especially with the problems connected with the historical element in Christianity.

Brunner maintains that in the ordinary sense of the word the Christian faith is not concerned with history at all, since it does not gain its unique character from its historical connexion, but he is quite alive to the fact that Christianity 'is absolutely concerned with an external historical fact.' 'All depends,' he says, 'upon the fact that the Word did become flesh, and this means that the Eternal has entered into the sphere of external historical

fact.' How, then, comes it to pass that a theological movement which in its main emphasis is a very pillar of orthodoxy can include among its adherents Rudolf Bultmann, one of the most radical of modern New Testament critics?

Brunner meets the difficulty by contending that 'dependence on history as a science leads to a state of hopeless uncertainty,' and by pressing the distinction between the Christ who came 'in the flesh' and 'Christ after the flesh.' The "Christ in the flesh" offers a common point of interest both to the chronicler and to the believer. The believer believes in the Christ of whom the chronicler also must have something to report. But the Christ who is set forth by the chronicler, by the author of a report, or by the historian who is most profoundly prepared by all his previous training to understand the great and truly human in history, or by the man who in all reverence watches and listens for the voice of God within history, is the "Christ after the flesh." The believer alone sees more than the "Christ *after* the flesh" in the "Christ in the flesh."

The idea behind this adaptation of the language of 2 Co 5¹⁶ is not, of course, new in Brunner's teaching; nor is it new in contemporary discussion; it is implicit, for example, in Professor James Mackinnon's distinction between the Historic Jesus and the Jesus of History. None the less the distinction is so fully treated in Brunner's

Mediator that it may be well to give another quotation. 'He alone can know the Christ who came "in the flesh" who does not know Him "after the flesh." For the historical student, for the historian and biographer, He remains the Rabbi Jesus of Nazareth, or the religious genius. This is the "Christ after the flesh," and to know Christ in this way is to know Him "after the flesh," even when such knowledge consists in the most profound and penetrating understanding of the personality of Jesus. But to know the "Christ come in the flesh" is to "know Him according to the Spirit"; this is the knowledge of faith, the knowledge of the Eternal Son of God as the "Word made flesh."' "

The freedom left by this distinction for historical criticism is manifest, and it can no longer be a matter of surprise that a Bultmann among the Barthians is possible. There is, of course, no need for theologians of this school to be radical New Testament critics. Brunner's treatment of critical problems, for example, is conservative, although even he thinks that the Virgin Birth has obscured the meaning of the central thought of the Christian message, and is sure that the Empty Tomb 'plays no part whatsoever in the New Testament as the foundation for faith in the Resurrection.' None the less, Barthianism, as Brunner presents it, is a remarkable example of orthodoxy without shackles. He can go so far as to say that, when 'positive' theologians (as distinguished from liberal theologians) base their arguments on the 'Jesus of History,' 'it is a sign of their uncertainty.' His basal principles are that 'Faith never arises out of the observation of facts, but out of the Word of God,' and that 'Faith alone is able to know rightly the historical reality of Jesus Christ.' The position, it will be seen, is a logical development of Lutheranism at its best.

The attractiveness of Brunner's exposition is undoubted. Who would not be a citizen of two worlds, with the rights of the intellect in the one and the privileges of faith in the other? But is it possible, after all, to keep the two worlds so separate?

Can Reason and Faith so easily, like the leopard and the kid, lie down together? Brunner's answer is that it is not impossible, so long as Faith postulates nothing which can be proved by historical science to be non-existent.

Brunner does not believe that a sane criticism stands in contradiction to the demands of Faith; on the contrary, Faith faces a field open for its exercise. He argues that the ecclesiastical dogma of Christ is scriptural through and through, and that there is no unbridged gulf between the Pauline-Johannine faith in Christ and that of the Primitive Church. The destructive effects of historical criticism, he believes, have been greatly overestimated. 'On the whole,' he says, 'the picture of Jesus which is sketched by the most extreme critics who verge on actual scepticism (like Bultmann, for instance) does not differ very greatly from the picture given by the Synoptic Gospels.' The average scientific picture of Jesus at the present time is neither the 'Liberal' portrait of Jesus nor the Christ of Orthodoxy. 'It is more concrete and more living than either of these, and yet at the same time more remote and more difficult to grasp.' The stiffness and unreality of a Byzantine picture has disappeared.

All this, and in particular Brunner's most interesting chapter on 'The Historical Figure of the God-Man,' is an excellent piece of apologetic, but it is characteristic of Brunner that immediately he suspects this, he is at once up in arms with the war-cry: 'Faith cannot be proved valid by human argument.' First and last, Faith is a venture, the decision and obedience of the soul that is confronted by the Word of God in Jesus Christ.

Brunner's vindication of the rights, and the duty, of historical research is worthy of all praise, but it is not here, we think, that the main need of many of his readers will be found to lie. What is wanted more than anything else is a richer and more satisfying conception of Faith. There is perhaps no word he uses more, or defines more often; it none the less remains true that there is no conception which cries out for study so much on the part of Barthians.

Faith, as Brunner sees it, belongs to the sphere of Biblical revelation; it 'depends on the Word of God alone, which can be trusted because it is the Word of God': indeed, 'Faith is pure dependence on revelation.' We have no desire to contest the positive truth of this: but how much more remains to be said! Faith is surely far more dynamic, far more personal, and far more human than Brunner will admit. He approaches such a view when he says that Faith 'is a wholly personal attitude towards the divine Personality,' but he is too much afraid of the ghost of Schleiermacher to follow this thought far. If only Brunner could forget Schleiermacher and Ritschl and the Enlightenment for a while; if only the word 'mysticism' did not bring him to his feet in wrath; if only he were less suspicious of a term like 'Christian experience'! Then might we gain from him the book we still look for and, we believe, the message this age needs.

Paley's famous argument from design, once so convincing, was for a long time under a cloud. In nineteenth-century scientific circles materialistic views were in the ascendant, and Paley's watch became a standing joke. Any suggestion that the evolutionary flux had guidance and purpose in it was not counted worthy of serious argument, but was simply laughed out of court.

With the new century and all its wonderful and dire events there has come a remarkable turn of the tide. The science of to-day speaks with a new voice and in tones which are far more sympathetic to a spiritual interpretation of Nature.

Evidence of this will be found in *The Great Design*, edited by Frances Mason (Duckworth; 8s. 6d. net). In this book fourteen scientists deal with the problem of whether there are order and intelligence in Nature, and they bring weighty reasons in support of an affirmative answer.

It cannot be said that the book is of equal value throughout. Each writer has been left with a free

hand, and there is in consequence a good deal of overlapping. There is also a lack of logical sequence and naturally a considerable diversity of view. Perhaps the best known contributors are Sir Oliver LODGE, Professor C. Lloyd MORGAN, and Professor HANS DRIESCH, though some would doubtless give pre-eminence to the late Sir J. Arthur THOMSON, who writes a beautiful article on 'The Wonder of Life.'

'A scientific explorer from another planet, examining the earth at some future stage in its history, could not account for the remains or ruins of the roads, the bridges, the houses, the churches, as the result of physics and chemistry alone. He would have to postulate the activity of a race that had designed and planned these things, and constructed them for some specific purpose.' That quotation from the pen of Sir Oliver LODGE might have been written by Paley himself. It is on all-fours with his celebrated illustration of the watch found in a desert place for which a designer must be postulated. This argument, however it may have been overpressed by its defenders, and however subtly it may have been confuted by its opponents, has never ceased to make its impression on the minds of plain men, and it is interesting to see it sponsored anew by so distinguished a scientist.

Professor DRIESCH, whose experimental work in embryology has been recognized as of the first importance, writes a chapter on 'The Breakdown of Materialism.' He describes briefly how the segmented egg can be separated so as to produce two or four normal organisms instead of one, how two eggs can be made to coalesce, and how at a later stage of development parts may be transposed without injury or disorganization. The point of these experiments is that the development of a living being is not rigidly predetermined so as to proceed in a machine-like manner. 'The machine theory of development or morphogenesis has been completely refuted. A "machine," i.e. a specific material structure working by the interaction of its material parts, cannot be the basis of development and regeneration, in short, of morphogenesis.' For a machine does *not* remain what it has been, if you

take away as many parts as *you like*, in any place *you like*—(note the double “you like”)—or if you disturb the arrangement of the parts. But here we have a something which *does* remain what it is, as regards its capacities, after the drastic disturbances of the type above described. In this way the mechanistic theory has been refuted in the field of embryology.’

There would seem to be a growing consensus of opinion that the world cannot be explained otherwise than as the product of intelligence. ‘Is there mind behind the universe? Certainly no one in his senses would feel any justification, from the facts of science, in answering “no,” for no one who understands even the rudiments of logic would think of asserting a universal negative. But there is an impressive body of scientific evidence which makes the inference of mind behind or within Nature a perfectly rational working *hypothesis*.’

To Sir Oliver LODGE it is more than a hypothesis; it is the faith by which he lives. In a noble passage he says: ‘In dealing with the universe as a whole we have no prehistoric qualms to contend with, no hesitation about attributing Intelligence to the operations of a distant Mind or Logos.’ “In the beginning was the Word.” The mind responsible is still active to-day, and we have no reason to suppose that it has changed in the least. The material universe has evolved, and has rendered possible a fresh influx of spiritual reality as it attained greater complexity, but the Creator may be the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever. His design and purpose in bringing the Universe into existence may not be apparent to us; or we may form some hazy conception of it. That is a relative and subjective matter, not of much consequence except to ourselves. But surely we may have faith that there is a Design and Purpose running through it all, and that the ultimate outcome of the present cosmos, and all its manifold puzzles, will be something grander, more magnificent, and more satisfying than anything we unaided can hope to conceive.’

Granted that there is design and purpose manifest in Nature, the further question remains to be

answered, namely: What is that design and purpose? This is a question that carries us beyond the realm of natural science into that of metaphysics. Professor Metcalf, however, in his contribution offers some suggestions. He sees in Nature a striving after an ever-increasing abundance of life, beauty, and love. The whole is not to be understood unless full account is taken of man with all his spiritual capacities and powers, with his sense of duty, with his appreciation of the beautiful. He is part of Nature, and of Nature at its highest, and in him Nature reveals most intimately her purpose. In the very nature of the case we must find the Why in personality and in the values which only persons can appreciate. ‘Survey the whole sweep of evolution; the wonder of regulation amid the immensities of the universe, beyond the reach of the most powerful telescope; the equal wonder of regulation amid the minutiae of atomic structure and behaviour, far beyond the penetration of the microscope; the emergence of life on the Earth, on that speck of the universe of which we know most; the gradual development of intelligence, of reason, of appreciation of beauty and of power to create beauty, even the transcendent beauty of personal character. A star is no greater than a violet; gravitation as a force cannot transcend love, for love seems incomparably more effective, more forceful than any physical force, lying as it does at the very root of the universe. But it is all one, beginning in the dust and reaching up into persons who can appreciate and create beauty, and feel love—a constantly changing whole, alive, personal. And it doth not yet appear what there shall be.’

Canon STREETER recently delivered the nineteenth annual, Hale Memorial ‘Sermon,’ and chose as his subject *The Church and Modern Psychology* (S.P.C.K.; 1s. net). In his hands the treatment of the subject is not only competent; it is also, as one might expect, lively and suggestive. He begins by comparing and contrasting the attitude taken by the Church toward Psychology, up-to-date, with its attitude in the past to other sciences when they were as young as the New Psychology is to-day.

The Roman Church made a big mistake in the case of Galileo. And the Protestant Church repeated it in the case of Darwin, though fortunately, even before the Darwinian theory had completely established itself in scientific circles, a minority of thinkers within the Church had begun to analyse the situation, and reached a saner conclusion. The recent scientific movement known as the New Psychology marks an epoch in human thought in this field as obviously as do the names of Galileo and Darwin in the fields of astronomy and biology. It is therefore a fact of great importance that the Church as a whole has not in our days repeated in regard to the New Psychology the error which it made of old in regard to Galileo and Darwin. It is clear that we have to come to terms with this new science, but it is equally clear that psychology is not necessarily an enemy of religion.

Admittedly, if all the conclusions drawn by certain psychologists are true, the existence of God is a pathological illusion, and Christian ethics are an irrational taboo. This may fairly be said of the Behaviourist school, which is an almost purely American product. And to it Canon STREETER turns first of all. The Behaviourists have carried through an uncompromising attempt to explain all the activities of the human mind in terms of mechanism. But, in the course of expounding the mechanical aspect of these activities, they have really demonstrated that to try to explain the workings of the human mind by mechanical conceptions *alone* can only result in absurdities.

According to the Behaviourist, thought is nothing more than a mechanically determined reflex action, of which the subject *happens* to be aware. To this Dr. STREETER replies in a trenchant and conclusive argument. First, he says, if our awareness of objects is largely compounded of illusion, all conclusions based on it are untrustworthy, however scientific they may seem. If the mind does not know when it knows, then all knowledge, including that which the Behaviourist calls psychology, is illusion also. Secondly, to say that thought is merely a mechanically determined reflex action is but an elaborate way of saying that thinking is not

really thought. The essence of thinking lies in its ability to distinguish between what is true and what is false.

Reflex action, on the other hand, is only the way in which an organism responds, and *cannot help* responding, to a particular stimulus. If I am asked a question, what matters is not that I reply, but that I give a *correct* reply. Now automatic reflex action may be relied on to reply; but only by an accident can it be the right reply. If the Behaviourist premise were true, we could never know it to be true; all we could say would be that the mind of the Behaviourist has been so conditioned by previous experience that, when presented with this theory, it registers 'true,' while the opposite conclusion is registered by the minds of other people whose reactions have been differently conditioned. But to say that is to deny the possibility of science itself, and the validity of its method and results.

But there are other schools of psychology which are more important in themselves, and important particularly in their bearing on religion. And Dr. STREETER singles out two points among others that raise practical issues. One emerges in connexion with the emphasis laid on instinct. In the animal world instinct and environment are so well adjusted that instinctive action is normally that which is best adapted to the welfare of the individual, and still more to that of the species. This is far, however, from being the case with man. His environment has become highly complicated with his advance in civilization, and every advance has complicated it still more. Yet the instincts which man inherits from his animal ancestry have been very little changed. Thus, for civilized man, there exists an enormous unspanned gulf between the kind of action which is best for himself and his species, and the kind of action which is the expression of the natural instinctive response to the stimuli of his environment.

There is a conspicuous *maladjustment* between the instinctual organization of man and the demands of the artificial environment into which in civilized countries he is born. This maladjustment

constitutes the greatest problem with which the educationists, and the individual himself, have to deal. A large part of what theologians call 'Original Sin' is really the result of this. Europe inherited from St. Augustine a diagnosis of this maladjustment which attributed to human nature an original depravity. And Calvin gave to the Augustinian doctrine both a more clear-cut form and an extended lease of popularity. Against this diagnosis of man's disease the theory of the 'noble savage,' with its implication of an original perfection of human nature, was an extreme reaction.

Educational theories and practice in Europe and America have been largely influenced by one or the other of these two false diagnoses of the human problem. Traditional education was largely based on the former. The newer education leans heavily to the latter. There are some modern theories of education which would only be justified if we were entitled to accept the theory of the 'noble savage.' But no educational theory can be psychologically sound which minimizes the extent of the maladjustment which the normal child and adolescent must overcome before he can become a tolerable member of civilized society. Moral personality must be acquired; and it cannot be acquired without cost.

One other point in Dr. STREETER's striking essay must be briefly referred to. He has been impressed by the close resemblance of Freud's view of morality to that of St. Paul before his conversion. Freud regards morality as a set of rules imposed by society upon a recalcitrant individual, beginning in early life. These rules have a certain quality of

awe attached to them, since they have been imposed by the authority of some one, like the father, who to the child is a majestic personage. Nevertheless, the awe with which they are regarded is balanced by a resentment which necessarily brings with it internal conflict.

This conception is substantially identical with the view of morality under the law which St. Paul entertained before he became a Christian. The Law was regarded by him as something majestic in its claim to obedience. The commandment is 'holy and righteous and good.' Yet, by the mere fact that it made that claim, it stimulated in him an instinct of resentment and rebellion. 'I had not known sin except through the law; for I had not known coveting, except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet.'

Accordingly the change from being an orthodox Jew to being a Christian was conceived by St. Paul primarily as a *liberation*. The Christian was no longer 'under the law.' To him right conduct had become a form of *self-expression*. But it was right not because it was *self-expression*, but because the self-expressed had been transformed. Through Christ, Paul had entered into a new relation to God. He was not a servant but a joyful son. Christ was born within him. There are circles to-day in which what is called 'self-expression' seems the first and great commandment. But self-expression will be a good thing or a bad thing according to the inner quality of the self which is expressed. To St. Paul Christianity is self-expression; but it results inevitably in moral acts because it is the expression of a self recreated by the spirit of Christ.

Things most certainly Believed.

BY THE REVEREND A. E. GARVIE, M.A., D.D., D.Th., LONDON.

I. IN writing the first of the series of articles which the editors, wisely in my judgment, are providing on this subject in the pages of THE EXPOSITORY TIMES, I may be allowed to offer a few introductory

comments. (1) There can be no doubt about the importance of the subject. If there be any belief in God at all, that belief must be the supreme belief, to which all other beliefs must be sub-

ordinate, and by which all other beliefs must be determined. As a man thinks of God, so will he think of world and self. (2) No less opportune does the subject appear. What has gone wrong with the world in its present difficulties, despondencies, and distresses is that it has forgotten God, that it has not made Him the predominant partner in all its planning and performing, but has followed its own ways, and trusted its own devices. Hence the *crisis* which is on deeper scrutiny, a *krisis*, or judgment on men forsaking God. Recovery can come only as men return to God, and seek counsel of Him. The Christian way is the only way of deliverance and safety, prosperity and progress. 'Be not deceived; God is not mocked: for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap' (Gal 6⁷). (3) As in Jesus the Christ our Lord, God has disclosed His mind, heart, and will, the holy love, which saves through sacrifice, and realizes the Kingdom of God on earth, never had the Christian faith a fuller opportunity and a greater obligation of world-conquest, bringing the kingdoms of this world into obedience to God and His Christ. (4) There is a turning towards religion; but it is not always towards Christ. There are rival claimants, naturalism and humanism, and even a Christless theism; and it is necessary to show that Christ alone has the words of the eternal life, and that the world will err if it depart to any other Master (Jn 6⁶⁷). (5) While I am convinced as a result of many years of study that the Christian Church can offer an adequate argument to the human reason and an authoritative appeal to the human conscience, yet more persuasive than any such argument or appeal is the evidence of personal experience, individual and corporate, to the sufficiency of Divine grace through human faith, the watchword of the Reformation, *sola gratia sola fide* as the remedy for human ills. Hence such individual testimonies as will be given here are of value in the corporate influence of the Christian Church upon the world. (6) We are not concerned here with *what ought to be believed* on authority, œcumenical creeds, or denominational confessions, but with *what is believed* on personal conviction, individual faith. (7) What in belief as in practice must, however, be avoided is *individualism*, self-isolation from or self-assertion against the Christian community. It can be confidently said that the more a man penetrates into the sanctuary of the Divine revelation and the human redemption in Christ, the more certainly will he not find himself solitary, but in the company of the sages, seers, and saints, the 'great cloud of witnesses,' all 'looking

unto Jesus, the author and finisher of our faith' (Heb 12²). (8) As one who abandoned with much pain Scottish Presbyterianism on account of conscientious scruples about creed-subscription, and who for more than forty years has been a minister of Congregationalism, which imposes no creed, I desire to state my own conviction that it is not a lawless freedom which leads a man to truth, but an independent loyalty to what is the common faith of the Christian Church.

II. (1) Brought up in Scottish Presbyterianism, in religious circles where a confident and aggressive evangelical type of piety prevailed, the Cross of Christ—His atonement for sin—was the central conviction, and to this through all doubts I clung, despite difficulties about the prevalent doctrine of the Atonement. Although I have in my theological pilgrimage travelled far from the theory of *penal substitution*, yet that Cross stands unmoved as the focus of my thought and life. Some years ago, when asked to write a sermon for a volume, entitled 'If I had Only One Sermon to Preach,' or some such words, I chose as my text Paul's confession: 'Far be it from me to glory, save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, through which the world hath been crucified unto me, and I unto the world' (Gal 6¹⁴ R.V.). To this may be conjoined the practical sequel to such a faith: 'The love of Christ constraineth us; because we thus judge, that one died for all, therefore all died: and he died for all, that they which live should no longer live unto themselves, but unto him who for their sakes died and rose again' (2 Co 5¹⁴ R.V.). Hence, it is quite impossible for me to return to the Reformation doctrine of *justification by faith* as an adequate summary of Christian truth, unless its forensic interpretation is abandoned, and a spiritual and ethical takes its place, unless it be held to mean *reckoning righteous in order to make righteous*, and even then the word *righteous* is too narrow to cover the relation of God and man in Christ. I myself must advance from Ro 1-5, the argument of the Jewish Rabbi against Pharisaic Judaism, to Ro 6-8, the confession of the Christian Apostle of what Christ had been in him, and had done for him. My vital experience I find expressed ideally, if not altogether and always actually, in Paul's words: 'I have been crucified with Christ; yet I live; and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me' (Gal 2²⁰ R.V.). As a theologian, if I may claim that title, I am compelled to form a theory of the objective significance as well as the subjective value of the Cross, and to relate the latter to the former. It is because the Cross makes manifest the holiness of

God as righteous judgment as well as loving forgiveness of the sin of the world, that it constrains the penitence for sin and the faith in forgiveness as the motive of holiness which are exercised in this experience of personal union with Christ. But any and every theory must be subordinate to the experience, and men may possess the experience who never framed the theory. It is not belief in the theory which brings the experience; but the experience which leads men, as reasoning beings, to form the theory. It is the Living Christ Himself who saves and becomes the Lord of the saved, and not any doctrine about Him. What I most surely believe is that He has saved, is still saving, and will ever save me. 'I know him whom I have believed, and I am persuaded that he is able to guard that which I have committed unto him against that day' (2 Ti 1¹² R.V.).

(2) Central as the Cross remains, and essential as is this evangelical type of faith for me, yet from that centre there has been a widening circumference of Christian thought and life. From the *work* of Christ I must needs pass to the *person*, from the gospel of Paul to the Gospels concerning Jesus. I increasingly realized that the character of the death was determined by the content of the life. It was what He the Crucified was that made the Cross what it was. The critical literary and historical questions about the Gospels, although I recognized their crucial importance, have always been of subordinate interest for me; the inner life of Jesus for more than twenty years engaged my study and meditations and vitally affected my experience and, I dare to believe, my character. To companion with Him as I tried to do has not been in vain; something of His life has passed into mine. Much less boldly than Paul, and in all humility and sincerity, I have known something, if far less than I might had faith as fully claimed what grace freely offered, of the inward change: 'we all, with unveiled face reflecting [R.V.m. *beholding*] as a mirror the glory of the Lord, are transformed into the same image from glory to glory, even as from the Lord the Spirit' (2 Co 3¹⁸ R.V.). The doctrine of the Incarnation thus claimed attention, as an intelligible explanation of the impression and the influence upon me of the Living Person, who, as it were, stepped out of the distant past of the records into the immediate present of the experience, for the Christ who had died and rose again as Saviour and Lord was now filled with the content of the Jesus of history, and meant and was worth so much the more for me. Never sharing the to me too materializing views of *sacramentarianism*, the In-

carnation became *sacramental*, the historical personality became the expression and the conveyance of the Divine reality; and hence the *sacraments*, especially the Lord's Supper, became not mere signs, but truly symbols, conveying to faith the Divine grace which they signified, but always as signs and seals of the gospel, and subordinate to it. Thus I found myself less alien, more akin to the *sacramental* type of piety, not as a substitute for, but an extension of the *evangelical* type.

(3) This absorption, for so I can call it for many years, with the Gospels, led me further in two directions—the theological and the ethical. As I believed Jesus to be Divine, my faith in Him may be said to have been directed towards God, but God as God was in the background, till the Son, revealing the Father whom He alone knew and could reveal as such (Mt 11²⁷) became the true and living way to the Father (Jn 14⁶). There is a type of piety which stops short at Jesus, His human attraction, and is not led by Him to the Father whom He came to reveal, and so loses much of the fulness of His revelation. His historical personality is not an end in itself, but is the *sacrament* of the eternal reality of God, and it is in this alone that the full satisfaction of man's whole personality can be found, for the whole temporal process of Nature and history finds its full meaning and worth in the eternal reality: and the life of Jesus Himself has not its full content unless on this universal background. He interprets not only this temporal process, but this its eternal setting. God as revealed in Christ, not Jesus apart from God, or God apart from Him, but God in Him in inseparable unity is the object of my Christian faith. As He, and not the whole Bible, is the *formal* principle of my theology, so God's Fatherhood is the *material* principle, to recall the distinction made by the Reformation. This is no depreciation of the Bible as the literature of the preparatory, progressive, and historically interpretative revelation, of which He is the focus, and which only in Him can be clearly and fully understood. I cannot believe anything about God inconsistent with His revelation of the Father; I can believe anything that can be deduced from that revelation. His revelation includes the ethical monotheism of the prophets; the perfect Father is righteous as well as good, judges as well as forgives sin, disciplines His children through suffering that He may develop them in His likeness. The tenderness, gentleness, and kindness of Jesus must not be detached from His moral integrity and severity, as disclosing the secret of God's Fatherhood. Not only the Holy Scriptures must be brought into

relation to our understanding of God's Fatherhood, but also what Nature and history disclose as to the moral order, in which God rules as Judge as well as Saviour. But with all these cautions I accept God's Fatherhood in Christ as the eternal God who is my refuge, and whose everlasting arms are underneath not me alone, not mankind alone, but the whole world. Challenged by the problem of evil, pain, and sin, that conviction remains unshaken, for only in God's reconciling and redemptive purpose can any solution of the problem become credible. As Paul in the benediction passes from the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ to the love of God (cf. 1 Co 16²³ and 2 Co 13¹⁴), so have I found through the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ the love of God.

(4) Passing now from the theological to the ethical content of the revelation in Christ, we may base the one upon the other. God is moral perfection, the holy Father; and men as His children must also be holy. Christian morality is the conduct of the children of God, whom He is making like Himself. The following of the example of Jesus is the imitation of God; and neither is an outward conformity, but an inward transformation, as has already been suggested. It is not because the phrase the Kingdom of God suggests a society, for the meaning is much more *rule* than *realm*, that Christian ethics is social, but because discipleship meant companionship with Jesus in a company, and the Christian Church from the beginning was the community of the Spirit. The supreme law of absolute love to God and equal love for self and neighbour would have no content except in a society. Christian service half a century ago in the slums of Glasgow filled me with a passionate indignation against the wrongs, and an intense compassion for the miseries of men, women, and children, due to a false and bad social order, or rather disorder. Hence for me the Christian ethics includes not only individual and domestic morality, to which it has too often been confined, but also economic, civic, national, and international righteousness and goodness. What has been called the *social* gospel is not another gospel, but the gospel in its widest and most consistent practical application. Jesus's startling declaration: 'If ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses' (Mt 6¹⁵), so inseparably combines man's relation to God and man's relation to his fellows—religion and morality—that it is no gospel which is not social. In my judgment much of the insufficiency and inefficiency of the Christian churches is due to their having disproportionately cultivated piety instead of promoting righteous

dealings among men in all relations. Crucial as was the issue for Paul of the controversy about circumcision, yet he reaches beyond it to something more essential: 'In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision; but faith working through love' (Gal 5⁶ R.V.). A holy human society, and not only holy human individuals, is the purpose for mankind of the Holy Father—God *all things in all men* (1 Co 15²⁸).

(5) Not only on account of the teaching of Jesus regarding the Holy Spirit and of the records in Acts regarding the presence and the power of the Holy Spirit in the Primitive Church, but from my personal experience of the dependence of my own inner life on God's sovereignty of grace (in no exclusive sense as in Calvinism), from the manifestations of Divine activity in religious revivals, and from the conviction of the need of the Church for constant Divine guidance for the fulfilment of its tasks in the world, have I been led in increasing measure to emphasize the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Although the dogma of the Spirit was formulated in the Church from no inner compulsion, but from the outward of heresy, and though the formula was framed in logical parallelism to that of the person of Christ, the doctrine is not to be regarded as useless theological baggage, which the Church may discard on its theological journey; it is an essential interpretation of a vital element in the experience of believers, and an element which needs to be insisted on to-day, since the Church is in constant danger of seeking the safeguards of its unity and continuity in creed and code, ritual and polity instead of the constant and universal sovereign activity of God through the Spirit as the Life-Giver. The God who is 'in all, and through all, and over all,' who in relation to mankind is the universal Father, has revealed Himself, and redeemed man in Jesus as Christ and Lord, and Son of His love, and is continuing and diffusing that revelation and redemption in the inner activities of the Holy Spirit as enlightening, cleansing, hallowing, and renewing all who by faith receive and respond to His grace. This for me is no theological creed merely, it is a religious experience. It is the one God who in all this fulness is fulfilling His purpose of love in and for me, in and for all who are willing to receive His 'unspeakable gift.' The dogmatic formulæ of two natures in one person, or three persons in one substance, do not express what God is to me, for not only are the terms, *nature*, *person*, *substance* ambiguous in their meaning, and not only do the phrases inadequately express the unity of Christ's person, and the unity of the reality of God, but the formulæ

are cold abstractions in comparison with the glowing concreteness of the experience.

(6) For me, accordingly, as religion is nothing else and nothing more than my personal relation of dependent faith, or rather God's personal relation of sovereign grace, for His, not mine, is the constant initiative, so theology is for me only the doctrine of the one God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. I have lightened the ship to save it from shipwreck in the storms of theological difficulty and doubt of much of the old cargo, such as Biblical cosmology, anthropology, psychology, and eschatology, and left on board only what could be deduced from, or be found consistent with, this doctrine of God in the Bible's teaching about world, man, sin, salvation, duty, and destiny. Such doctrines as verbal inspiration, particular election, original sin, total depravity, eternal punishment, penal substitution, have for me gone into a sea, which I hope, despite some contemporary reactionary tendencies, is not going to give up its dead. The affinity of nature as the possibility of the community of life between God and man, the reality of sin, the necessity of salvation, the insufficiency of man to save himself, the sufficiency and the sovereignty of Divine grace in saving, the joy and the peace of forgiveness, the purifying and perfecting of man by the Spirit of God, the final blessedness of the saints, even 'the larger hope'—the Kingdom of God as the objective, the eternal life as the subjective aspect of the Divine purpose of redemption and reconciliation—that is my theology, based on the revelation of God in Christ as interpreted by the Spirit, and verified in experience—these are for me 'the things most certainly believed.' If all Christians shared this experience fully, if the Church proclaimed this theology fully, not only as an inheritance from the past, but as a possession in the present, ever vivified and vitalized for thought and life by God's own Spirit, could it not meet the challenge of the age in its doubt or denial, the need of the world for counsel and power? And would not the gospel of the love of God, revealed in the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and realized in the 'common possession' of the Holy Spirit be once more the power and the wisdom of God unto salvation? The Church has hitherto tended to believe

too many things, most of them circumferential and not central; it cannot believe *too much* with intense and enthusiastic conviction in the few things that are *central* which I have tried so inadequately to state.

(7) This statement, to fulfil its purpose, has necessarily been personal; but I have tried not to allow it to be egotistic; for I would laud and magnify only the God who saved, and not make prominent the man saved. I am convinced that the churches must make quite clear that, while they share the faith of the past generations, they are not bound by their creeds. In Germany and other Continental countries there is said to be a return to the Reformation; there is a Neo-Calvinism and a Neo-Lutheranism, and so the movement suffers from division. When at a recent meeting some British and Continental theologians avowed themselves either stiff-necked Lutherans or stiff-necked Calvinists, I was tempted to paraphrase the words of Paul: 'Is Christ divided? Was *Luther* crucified for you? or were ye baptized into the name of *Calvin*?' (1 Co 1¹³). I was much relieved when one at last avowed himself 'a stiff-necked Christian'; he knew the mischief which theological division can do, for he came from a land where the Church's witness and work are hindered by sectarianism. To return to Christ, and Him alone, as in my early manhood I was forced to do, is not merely a *backward* movement in history, it is an *upward* movement to reality in God, for in Him eternity broke into time, which 'like a dome of many-coloured glass stains the white radiance of eternity,' and shed its white radiance over the many colours of time. 'The Word which was in the beginning with God and was God, became flesh, and tabernacled among us [and we beheld his glory, glory as of the only-begotten from the Father] full of grace and truth' (Jn 1¹⁻¹⁴). I so beheld His glory, and that glory has ever since been the light of all my seeing. Will the churches ever be persuaded to cease hugging the shores of their old creeds, and to launch out on the deep of a frank and fearless quest of Christ Himself, not Athanasius or Augustine, not Luther or Calvin, not Wesley or Newman, and so make a good voyage to the safe harbour: *sola gratia sola fide in Christo Jesu*?

Literature.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GERMAN PROTESTANTISM.

THE author of *Recent Developments in German Protestantism* (S.C.M.; 4s. net), Dr. Otto Piper, claims our sympathy as one of the academic victims of the Nazi rule in Germany, having been deposed from his Professorship of Systematic Theology in the University of Münster, where he was Karl Barth's successor. He commands our appreciation by the objective impartiality with which he seeks to present the situation in Germany. With characteristic thoroughness he begins with a section on 'The Historical Development of Protestant Theology,' from Mediæval Mysticism and Luther, passes through the 'Corruption of Luther's Work' to 'The Crisis.' Next he describes 'The Influence of the War,' and 'The Reaction of Post-War Theology to the War Experiences.' An analysis of 'The Theology of the Younger Generation' follows. After 'The Common Features' have been described, a distinction is made between 'The Conservative Type' and 'The Progressive Theology.' The volume closes with the author's judgment on 'The Historical Importance of the New Theology.' It is an inclusive survey, but suffers from undue condensation. A volume twice the size would have been of still greater value. Enough is given to whet, but not satisfy, the appetite. Even within the limits of the present volume a fuller treatment of the present situation would have been possible had the author dealt in a few sentences with the historical development, assuming the reader's knowledge of the previous history. It seems to us to be unjust to the history of German theology between Luther and the Crisis to represent it as only a corruption of Luther's work. With all seriousness may we suggest that German theology would benefit by detaching itself from Luther, and not cultivating so exclusively what, after all, was but one theological type, however vital, and at the time necessary? Grateful to the past teachers, the Christian thinker should not be enslaved to any, as for him there should be only one permanent authority, Jesus Christ, 'the same yesterday, to-day, yea, and for ever.'

To describe theological tendencies as machinations of Satan, as the author does, where he disapproves, is not only a lack of Christian charity, but is valueless as a substitute for historical explanation. In this volume Satan plays a more

important rôle in the drama of the Church than in our judgment a reasonable, and not superstitious, theology should assign to him. Important as was the influence of the War on German thinking, and the writer deserves our gratitude for the description he gives of it, we must not assume that the reactions of theology to it have a permanent value. As the trenches were no 'school of saints,' so they were not an academy for theologians. It was not a healthy but a morbid mentality which emerged from this humiliating and distressing experience. Accordingly we should regard the German theology of to-day not as a model to be imitated, but rather as a warning of what is to be avoided, although we should learn all we can from the author's interesting account of it. One hopeful feature which he notes is that the theology is much less academic than it was, and is more concerned about the problems of life and society. The writer's standpoint is eschatological; the situation presents itself to him as 'a conflict between Satan and Christ.' He is hopeful, but not confidently so. He claims for the result a wider interest. 'The problem which troubles German Protestantism is the fundamental problem of the Christian nations, and the attack which Satan directs against German Protestantism threatens Protestantism in its entirety. Therefore the victory to be won in Germany will be of importance, not only to Germany, but to the whole of Protestantism' (p. 159). With this conclusion we agree, although we do not profess to know as much about Satan's agency in the conflict as the author claims, preferring to apply to historical events the principle of cause and effect, sowing and reaping (Gal 6^{7t.}). One other assumption he makes which appears to us a meaningless abstraction. Germans differ in particulars from English and French men, but to make the idea of a 'German soul' basic is in our judgment a profound mistake, which can only mislead in an historical interpretation. 'Three of the essential traits of the German soul are: its desire for independence, alternating from time to time with a willingness for absolute submission, its fatalism and its pessimism' (p. 40). Are these traits peculiar to Germans, or characteristic of all Germans at all times?

The dissents we have thought it necessary to express are no depreciation of the value of the book, or the merits of the author. Because his thinking is so often unlike or opposed to our

own is a reason not against but for appreciative study of what he writes with such sincerity and earnestness.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE BOOKS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.

Students of the Old Testament who are unacquainted with Hebrew and who find Driver's Introduction too elaborate, will hail with joy Professor W. O. E. Oesterley and Professor T. H. Robinson's *An Introduction to the Books of the Old Testament*. It is lucidly written, as might be expected from two practised and successful lecturers like our authors; it gives exactly the kind of information which intelligent readers require; it discusses in a fresh and living way the many problems which arise; and it is very fair in its setting forth of the various solutions which eminent scholars have put forward.

The plan of the work is simple. After short chapters on the Canon and the Text, the authors take each Book in turn, in the order in which they appear in our English Bible. They have evidently deliberately sacrificed chronological sequence to convenience of reference. In the case of historical and narrative and prophetic Books, they discuss the structure and date, the historical background, the probable earlier sources, the methods of compilation, and so forth. When dealing with the Wisdom Literature, they treat of the cosmopolitan character of this type of literature, the extra-Biblical writings and the Hebrew conception of Wisdom. In connexion with the Psalms, there is a separate chapter on the Form of Hebrew Poetry and the Problems of Metre, and a good discussion on the titles, the dates, and the types of Psalms. When we come to the Prophets, we are provided with a very useful general Introduction. The Book of Isaiah receives specially elaborate treatment. It will show the general method of this section, if we treat it in some detail. The historical background of Isaiah's own time is briefly described. Structure and date follow. Taking, first, chapters 1-39, we are told that the original Isaianic Book is made up of a number of older, shorter collections. No less than seven earlier collections are pointed out (chs. 1, 2-5, 6-12, 13-23, 24-27, 28-35, 36-39). Each collection is analysed with special reference to the metres employed, and is shown to consist in most cases of a number of more or less independent oracles. The first collection contains nothing that cannot come from Isaiah himself, while the fifth is wholly composed of much later material. The

others consist of matters ranging from the eighth to the fifth (possibly even the second) century. Towards the end of this period came the gathering together of the various collections, and probably by 300 B.C. the Book existed in its present form.

Deutero-Isaiah (an anonymous work) is placed in the period 549-538 B.C., *i.e.* between Cyrus' victory over Astyages and the eve of the capture of Babylon (on p. 272 we should surely read 'the eve of the Return'). Trito-Isaiah (56-66) for the most part is assigned to the period 516-444 B.C., but 59, 63⁷-64¹² and 66⁵.¹⁷⁻²⁴ probably belong to the latter half of the fourth century B.C.

The other prophetic Books are treated adequately, but more summarily. The Introduction is thoroughly up to date. No serious omissions of reference to relevant literature have been noticed. One of the most valuable elements in it is the constant reference, with illustrations, to the value of the Septuagint. While each author is individually responsible for certain Books, yet the two have discussed together in every case the various problems which arise, and in almost every case have reached agreement. The one exception (see footnote, p. 272) relates to the question whether the words ascribed to the prophet do represent verbatim what the prophet said (so Robinson), or whether they are brief summaries of addresses which, in their spoken form, were much longer (so Oesterley). In either case the essence of the message is there.

The book is sure to be eagerly bought by wise students. The publishers are the S.P.C.K., and the price only ros. 6d. net.

THE HOLY SPIRIT.

The Revelation of the Holy Spirit, by the Rev. E. L. Strong, M.A., Priest of the Brotherhood of the Epiphany, Calcutta (S.P.C.K.; 6s. net), is a remarkably full Biblical and practical treatment of the doctrine in question. The book consists of Lectures given to the Oxford Mission Sisterhood of the Epiphany, Calcutta; it richly deserves the wider audience gained through publication, and will be found profitable to Christians of all Communion. Written in the conviction that the Church of to-day 'is making fresh efforts to seek the guidance of the Spirit,' the book treats the doctrine of the Holy Spirit as it is expressed in the Creeds, then, and with great detail, its presentation in the Bible, and finally its practical relationships. Much the greater part of the volume is concerned with Scriptural teaching. The point of view is devo-

tional rather than critical, the best sections being those which centre round the Great Discourse of Jn 14-16 and the High-Priestly Prayer of Jn 17. We heartily welcome the excellent discussion of the problems connected with the Trinity, and Part III., which deals with Practical Considerations, is pure gold, especially the account of the connexion between the Holy Spirit and Mysticism. There is a warmth of true religious experience, coupled with a real humanity of outlook, in this section of the book. It should also be added that the whole discussion is lit up by frequent references to existing conditions in India as they have come under the writer's observation. On the question of Church Unity, Mr. Strong writes as follows: 'Christ's prayer, then, is having remarkable answers in our day; and therefore, however far we may be still from unity of opinion, even where unity of opinion is necessary, the unity of the Church is being achieved. And the duty of us all is to overcome all temptations to irritation or impatience when it seems to us that people are obstinate or creating unnecessary obstacles to union; but to love those who differ from us, even in what we consider fundamental matters; to believe in their sincerity, that they are truly serving Christ, and that He is using their service. The unity of the Church will be brought about far more through the exercise of such love by the members of the different Christian bodies than by the unanimity of the opinion they arrive at. For the latter without the former does not create of itself Christian unity such as our Lord prayed for' (p. 146 f.).

It is hardly too much to say that Mr. Strong has given us a book which, in its way, might well be a devotional classic for all whose thoughts are turning to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit amid the difficulties and the demands of present-day Christianity.

VON HÜGEL'S RELIGIOUS THOUGHT.

There is room for another account of the thought of that great Christian theologian and apologist, the late Baron Von Hügel, and many will turn with interest to the pages of this new publication, *Von Hügel and the Supernatural* (S.P.C.K.; 12s. net), by Mr. A. Hazard Dakin, Jr., Ph.D. Dr. Dakin is well equipped for his task, but we could have wished that he had handled the material in a more systematic way and spaced it out better. His sentences are sometimes cumbersome, and sometimes lack dignity of style. And while he has supplied a good index of proper names, his book would have

been more useful had it contained also an index of subjects. Even so, we are grateful to him for what he has given us. The account of von Hügel's thought is comprehensive, and it is illustrated by many references to the writings of others, many of them published in the last few years.

The book first reviews von Hügel's beliefs about knowledge, showing that the desire for abundant life is the motive animating his epistemology, which takes the form of 'critical realism.' Then are reviewed his beliefs about the intimations of God and the supernatural, present in Nature and in man's constitution; about the means whereby religion defines and preserves the general awareness of the supernatural; about the relation of mysticism to the supernatural; about the content of the supernatural, as that is set forth in his teaching concerning God; and, finally, about the place of the supernatural in the practical conduct of life. Under this last heading von Hügel's answers to such questions as these are expounded: How ought we to face outer evil and inner sin? What should our attitude be towards the world of sensuous pleasure and desire? What lies on the other side of the doors of death? Obviously the range of this book is wider than the title might lead us to expect. We shall only add that the treatment of von Hügel's positions, while critical, is largely sympathetic.

BIBLICAL BACKGROUNDS.

For Biblical teaching the background, historical, social, and geographical, is important, not merely to make places and events vivid but even to make them real. There is an impression among children, which is difficult to dispel, that the Bible world is totally different from the world they know, a world of fantasy, a mysterious, ghostly world. The places are not *real* places, like London or Edinburgh or Stowe-in-the-Wold. The people are not *real* people like Hitler or King George or father and mother. And one of the first things a teacher has to achieve is to make the Bible a real book and its events and people actual. We therefore welcome warmly a book like *Biblical Backgrounds*, by Professor J. M'Kee Adams, Ph.D., Professor of Biblical Introduction in the Baptist Seminary at Louisville, Kentucky (Baptist Sunday School Board, Nashville, Tennessee; \$3.75). It professes to be a 'geographical survey of Bible lands in the light of the Scriptures and recent research.' But of course no one could sketch in the geography of the Bible without dealing with the history, the customs, and the religion as well. And all these are here.

Dr. Adams is qualified to write a book like this both by wide reading and by personal contacts with Bible lands. This work has been the labour of ten years, and he has seen to it that the results are well housed. The volume is beautifully printed and bound. It is enriched with twenty-five carefully drawn maps, and about a hundred beautiful photographs, mostly taken by the author himself. With regard to the contents, those who have read Breasted and George Adam Smith will not find a great deal that is new in Dr. Adams's pages. And perhaps the reader with an eye on the object may feel that there is a certain amount of 'irrelevant archaeology' here and there. But in this matter a plus is better than a minus. And one can say heartily that both the scheme of the book and its execution are excellent. We have first a survey of the Biblical world. Then in succession are treated Mesopotamia, Aram, Canaan, Egypt, four chapters on different periods in Canaan, the Hellenistic East, Palestine, Jerusalem, Asia Minor, and Græco-Roman centres. The book will be of very great value to teachers, but ministers, and all who are concerned with the use of the Bible, will find endless interest and reward in these chapters.

That Strange Man upon His Cross, by the Rev. Richard Roberts, D.D. (Abingdon Press; \$1.25), consists of four lectures (the Shaffer Lectures delivered at Yale University in 1934). The lectures paint a picture of Jesus as the Teacher, the Man of Action, and the Crucified. The story stops at Calvary and takes no account of the Resurrection. Dr. Roberts is more of a preacher than a lecturer. He is fervent, vivid, and interesting, very assertive and confident, but there is a certain lack of caution in his statements and of balance in his judgments. St. Paul is thoroughly taken over the coals for his sermon at Athens, on the wholly gratuitous assumption that he did not preach Christ. The inner consciousness of Jesus, with its secret doubts and fears and questionings, is an open book to the writer. One is left with the feeling that, with all his eloquent exposition, Dr. Roberts fails to bring us to the heart of the mystery of 'that strange man upon his cross.'

The Case for Faith-Healing is persuasively maintained in a book under that title by Mr. J. D. Beresford (Allen & Unwin; 5s. net). The main feature of the book is its intellectual power. Indeed, it is too intellectual for its purpose. It

is not simple enough for propagandist purposes, while the educated reader will find its crass philosophical idealism a sufficiently serious obstacle. The author's two main premises are, that God, immanent and transcendent, is the great creative spirit and the only reality, and that matter is a transient and largely illusory presentation of spirit in a temporal, 'three-dimensioned complex.' What he means by 'God' is a little hard to discover. He rejects Christian theism almost with scorn, but takes it back again when (on p. 185) he says that 'it should be unnecessary to add that love, faith, and all that we recognize as standing for the ideal of "goodness" are attributes of the Universal Spirit.' The theology of this book will satisfy nobody. But the book is well worth reading for its exposition of the power of faith, and also of the influence of mind on body.

The untimely death of Father Robert Hull deprived the Roman Church in England of one of its most promising scholars. A number of Essays from his able pen have been collected from periodicals and published under the title of *Medieval Theories of the Papacy* (Burns, Oates & Washbourne; 7s. 6d. net). Father Hull was a scholarly and singularly courteous controversialist; and all Protestants who feel constrained to maintain dispute with Roman views would do well, by perusal of this volume, to ensure that their understanding of the Roman position is not misunderstanding.

Mr. J. R. Watmough has published the Essay on *Orphism* (Cambridge University Press; 3s. 6d. net) which was awarded the Cromer Greek prize this year. What we have is so excellent that we wish we had more—that the writer had expanded the essay by giving a connected account of the teaching and ceremonial of the Orphic movement. True, much of this is given as we go along, but for the majority of readers a systematic account is, we think, almost a necessity. The author's interest is twofold. He shows that Orphism was no isolated phenomenon; as a mystical, reforming, and really religious movement it had its analogues in many fields. His second interest is to draw a parallel between Orphism and Protestantism. Here some will feel that at points he is just verging on the fanciful, if not the grotesque; but apart from that, the discussion is not only interesting but illuminating and suggestive. He closes by pointing to Orphic features of abiding worth—its notes of mysticism, light, and tranquillity.

Messrs. John Wright Buckham and George Malcolm Stratton have performed a pious service to the memory of their teacher and friend, Professor Howison, by publishing a memoir with selected passages from his writings—*George Holmes Howison, Philosopher and Teacher* (Cambridge University Press; 11s. 6d. net). Howison was one of the most successful and inspiring teachers of philosophy that America has had; and while this volume will be valued in a special degree by those who came into direct contact with him, the judicious selection of passages from his works will be found stimulating and helpful by those who knew him not.

Unity and Truth in the Church of England (Cambridge University Press; 1s. net) contains two sermons with notes by Dr. J. F. Bethune-Baker, Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge. Speaking as a 'modern' Churchman, he rejoices in the increasing freedom enjoyed within the Church of England, more particularly freedom to use old definitions and formularies, not in their literal or legal sense, but according to their 'religious construction.' Just as at the Renaissance the 'one fold' theory of the Church broke down irreparably, so nowadays the 'one creed' theory is in the same position—the theory, that is, that Christians are pledged for ever to definitions of their faith in terms of an obsolete philosophy and science.

We have before us the second volume of the series of concise manuals edited by Professor J. F. Bethune-Baker, D.D., under the general title of 'The Christian Religion, its Origin and Progress.' It deals with *The Expansion of the Christian Church* (Cambridge University Press; 7s. 6d. net). It consists of three sections—the first on 'The Church in the Roman Empire,' by the Rev. P. Gardner Smith; the other two on 'The Church in the Middle Ages' and 'The Church in England,' by the Rev. F. J. Foakes-Jackson. The names of the writers are sufficient guarantee of scholarly yet popular treatment. It is obvious that within the restricted limits assigned them—the whole volume on three such big topics extending to only three hundred and sixty-nine pages—a rather large brush must be used. Yet for the class of reader for whom the series is designed, and for the general reader too, the book is admirably conceived and happily executed.

The Master of Balliol, Dr. A. D. Lindsay, is always welcome on the title-page of a new book.

His earnestness, his intellectual grasp, his moral idealism are a bracing wind of the spirit. And he is never more effective or enlightening than when he is moving in the region where Christianity touches politics. His new book is called *The Churches and Democracy* (Epworth Press; 2s. 6d. net). The modest price is probably accounted for by the fact that the book is the Social Service Lecture for 1934, and is published for the Social Service Lecture Trust. (It can be had in paper covers for 1s. 6d. net.) Dr. Lindsay examines the contribution of the Free Churches to democracy, and the difference of this from that of philosophical radicalism. But he ranges farther as he goes on, and includes in his review the authoritarian view of the State as we see this in Italy, Russia, and Germany. The Christian view is based on the priesthood of believers, and here is the point of difference alike from the authoritarian state and the philosophical-radical state. But the real contribution of the Church to democracy lies in its development of smaller fellowships within the State in which freedom is fostered as well as loyalty. And so long as spiritual freedom lives in these lesser communities, so long will the problem of authority and liberty be solved in practice. It is difficult to do justice to a book like this by a brief summary. It is closely reasoned but never difficult. And it is as sane as it is Christian.

The Fernley Hartley Lecture for 1934, delivered by the Rev. Charles Pelham Groves, B.A., B.D., has for its subject *Jesus Christ and Primitive Need* (Epworth Press; 6s. net). In Part I. the writer gives a thoughtful study of the Christian message in history and experience. Part II. contains 'a characterisation of simple folk,' for which the writer draws on his experience as a missionary in Nigeria. Part III. shows how the Christian message is brought into contact with primitive people, how it meets their need, and develops them towards full manhood in Christ. The book is written with missionary students particularly in view, but the general reader will find it most informing and stimulating.

The Victorian Transformation of Theology (Epworth Press; 2s. 6d. net) contains the second series of Maurice Lectures delivered at King's College, London, this year by the Rev. J. Scott Lidgett, C.H., M.A., D.D. The three lectures of the series, after treating of the situation a century ago, pay tribute to the work and achievement of Frederick Denison Maurice, and then proceed to discuss the

themes of the Fatherhood of God, the Incarnation, and the Atonement, on which Maurice laid the greatest emphasis. It may be an exaggeration to say that Maurice was 'by far the most important and significant personality—the most potent and pervasive influence—in the religious life and thought of England during the past century,' but it is certainly well that his memory should be perpetuated, and that England's debt to him should be acknowledged. Belonging to no theological school, yet having affinities with Catholics, Evangelicals, and Modernists, he became both by his contacts and his aloofness the guide of many who looked for the Kingdom of God upon earth.

Church Unity Movements in the United States, by Dr. H. Paul Douglass (Institute of Social and Religious Research, New York; \$3.00), presents the results of a study to which the publishing Institute has devoted nearly four years. The aim of the study was to discover how far the sentiment for church union prevails in the United States, and how far it is likely to carry the churches in the more or less near future. Dr. Douglass, who directed the study and is the author of this substantial volume, has had experience of similar studies. He set about his task in a way characteristically American by issuing questionnaires, and no less than twenty thousand people appear to have contributed, positively or negatively, their quota of personal evidence. After an analysis of the mass of evidence thus collected, Dr. Douglass reaches the conclusion that 'a large partial union' of Protestant churches in the United States is not only possible but probable. The opinions gathered are said to be those of 'a genuine cross-section of the American public.'

Part I. of the volume deals with the objective phenomena of division and integration in the churches, Part II. with official assumptions and arguments on church unity and with the major topics of official discussion on this subject, and Part III. compares and appraises the two sets of evidence.

A great deal of industry and ingenuity have been expended in the production of this work, as witness the numerous tables and charts, and one hopes that the results achieved will be regarded as justifying the labour expended.

In the 'Every Teacher's Library' the twenty-first volume is devoted to *The Teaching of Temperance and Self-Control* (National Sunday School Union; 2s. 6d. net). The author is the Rev.

E. C. Urwin, M.A., B.D., and he has done justice to his subject. The treatment is original in that the author strives to awaken serious thought on moral ideals, and sets his particular subject in a context of conceptions that are broader and more appealing than the conventional temperance tract. Good use is made of the aid of science and of the masters in the athletic world. And altogether the book is a sane piece of work. We are not sure, however, that the total impression of the Bible teaching is exactly as it is represented here.

An excellent book on the religious use of the film is issued at a cheap price by the Religious Tract Society, *The Cinema for Christ*, by Mr. R. G. Burnett (1s. net). The author contends strongly for the use of the cinema in church life. He reveals, in some trenchant chapters, the evils that are associated with the cinema at present. And he urges upon church leaders the adoption of the film as a moral and religious instrument. There are many difficulties in the way, but he meets them all valiantly. 'It is no longer an expensive auxiliary that can be acquired only by an elaborately organized mission. . . . No church is too small to be competently equipped.' Of course, it is only at the evening service the practice would be adopted. This book is a pioneer one, and urges what will probably in time be widely accepted.

In *Five Centuries of Catholic Witness* (S.P.C.K.; 5s. net) the Rev. F. D. Vaughan, M.A., gives brief sketches of the life and work of no fewer than twenty-one Christian Fathers, from Clement of Rome to Gregory the Great. We do not know why Origen and Tertullian, beyond question two of the most important, the one in the East the other in the West, find no place. The sketches given, however, although slight, are never superficial, and the book will serve a good end in making many of the Fathers known in some measure to a wider circle.

Teachers of infant classes in dayschool and Sunday school will be grateful to Miss E. H. Phillips the headmistress of Christ Church Infants' School, Luton, for her collection of *Prayers for Infants and Junior Classes* (S.P.C.K.; 1s. net). They are quite simple, though some of the *ideas* employed would seem rather out of the reach of an infant class. Brief orders of service are furnished, with special prayers for occasions. Every other page is blank for teachers to record any discoveries of their own.

A well-argued plea for the importance of the religious element in education, and for a much larger place for religious education in the school, is made in *The State and Religious Education*, by Principal E. F. Braley, M.A., LL.D., and the Rev. M. C. Petitpierre, M.A. (S.P.C.K.; 3s. 6d. net). The first part of the book is exceedingly well done. Its exposure of the defects and deficiency in present-day religious teaching in the school was very much needed. Its arguments in favour of a fundamental change in the position religious education holds in our educational system are both lucid and convincing. The weak part of the book is its 'suggestions for improvement.' In particular, it is regrettable that the authors of this book have

committed themselves to a position which has been almost universally abandoned—the teaching of the Old Testament conception of God to junior pupils. 'There is no doubt that the small boy of eleven appreciates this so-called Old Testament God,' they say, and on the same page make the following astounding statement: 'It is doubtful whether a child of the Primary School can appreciate the Christian conception of God.' Happily, they contradict themselves flatly in the section on the Infant School, where we read, 'throughout this stage of school life emphasis should be laid upon the *Love* of God.' The chapters of a practical nature are superficial and are not on the level of the first half of the book.

Some Outstanding New Testament Problems.

Introduction.

BY PROFESSOR VINCENT TAYLOR, PH.D., D.D., WESLEY COLLEGE, HEADINGLEY, LEEDS.

I GLADLY respond to the invitation of the Editors of THE EXPOSITORY TIMES that I should write a few lines of Introduction to a Series of articles which is shortly to appear under the title of 'Some Outstanding New Testament Problems.'

Any one who attempts to draw up a list of the principal New Testament Problems which are of current interest will, I think, be surprised at their range and importance. What, for example, is the present position with regard to 'the elusive Q'? Whence did Mark derive the Sayings of Jesus? Does Luke contain an independent Passion Narrative? Are any further developments possible in respect of Canon Streeter's 'M Hypothesis'? Is there a special Gospel Tradition connected with Caesarea (the 'L Tradition'), and can we say by whom it was recorded? Is there a distinctive 'Johannine Idiom,' and what bearing has it on the historical value of the Sayings of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel? Was Jesus a Poet-Teacher? Has recent discussion thrown any new light on the nature of the 'Kingdom of God'? How stands the problem of the Resurrection-Narratives? What were St. Paul's relations with Corinth? Were the 'Epistles of the Imprisonment' written at Ephesus? In what ways have Schweitzer's views affected the problem of the Historical Jesus? This list, which does not pretend to be exhaustive, indicates some of the main issues; and most, if

not all of them, will be treated in the forthcoming Series.

Among the arrangements already made, I am permitted to say that 'The L Hypothesis and the Structure of the Lukan Gospel' will be discussed by Professor J. M. Creed, 'The Problem of the Resurrection-Narratives' by Archdeacon J. W. Hunkin, 'The Johannine Idiom' by Professor W. F. Howard, and 'The Elusive Q' by myself. Other arrangements are in progress and will be announced in due course.

The plan on which the various articles will be constructed is one, I think, which will be generally welcomed? Each article will consist of three parts. In Part I. the particular problem will be stated and its importance indicated; in Part II. methods of treating the problem will be discussed, and some account will be given of recent research, of the different hypotheses which have been advanced, and of the books and articles in which they are recorded; in Part III., at each writer's discretion, suggestions will be made as to the solution which commends itself best to the writer's judgment.

I am convinced that a Series of this kind will meet the needs of several kinds of readers. In the first place, there is the general reader who looks for an up-to-date knowledge of the position of New Testament Science in relation to its special problems, and who desires to relate this information to other

subjects in which, it may be, he is more keenly interested. Not a few of those who have to do with crowds, and have met anti-Christian objectors in the open air, have found how necessary it is to be well acquainted with current discussions of the historical element in Christianity. Then there is the Divinity Student who closes his text-books not, let us hope, with a sigh, but with a quickened interest and a desire to know still more about the fascinating problems to which he has been introduced. Finally, there is the Research Student who has already completed a B.D. Course, or its equivalent, and now stands at the parting of the ways. Either he will quickly lose much that he has gained at so much cost and settle down to become a merely desultory reader, or he will find an added interest in the possibility of penetrating into the hinterlands behind an already well-occupied country. His predilections may or may not be for New Testament Criticism, but this is not essential, since whatever subject he chooses, even if it be the study of the Complutensian Polyglott, nearly everything else will be involved in some way or other. If, however, he has already a love for New Testament problems, it may be that the present Series will open out the way to a course of fruitful research leading to some solid contribution to theological learning. Should this prove to be the case, I imagine that the Editors will feel that the Series of articles has been amply justified.

Besides meeting the needs of a number of readers there is another purpose which it is to be hoped the Series will fulfil. No one will pretend that the pace of Biblical research in Great Britain is swift. There is a good side to this; we are spared the perils of lightning forays, and a new idea has time to be assimilated or to die of pernicious anæmia. None the less, I am sure that progress ought to be more rapid than it is. It is just ten years since Canon Streeter in his *Four Gospels* poured a

handful of new problems into the lap of New Testament Criticism. Can British scholarship look with pride on its treatment of these problems, and have we so very much to show for ten years' further study? The same questions also press for an answer in connexion with Dr. G. S. Duncan's stimulating book, *St. Paul's Ephesian Ministry*. Along with others, I have sometimes wondered if more could be achieved by some kind of corporate investigation like that of the Oxford Society of Historical Theology which produced that invaluable work, *The New Testament in the Apostolic Fathers*; and there is no doubt that very useful work has been done in Seminars at Oxford and Birmingham and other centres. There are, however, severe limits within which corporate investigation is practicable; and, of course, nothing can replace the lonely work of the individual student. It is greatly to be hoped that the projected Series will increase the number of such students, and especially from among those who combine Biblical studies with pastoral duties, to the mutual benefit of each, for since the days of Matthew Poole this combination has been the traditional glory of British scholarship.

It may well be that such a Series as this will reveal the need for others dealing with the problems of the Old Testament, and with those of Theology. A book like the late R. H. Kennett's *The Church of Israel* is enough to show how many important and interesting Old Testament problems are in the melting-pot; and I have no doubt at all that readers of THE EXPOSITORY TIMES would like to share in, or at any rate to follow, these discussions. Whether we shall be permitted to do so depends in large measure upon the interest taken in the present New Testament Series. Those of us who read and prize THE EXPOSITORY TIMES generally get in the end what we want, or at least as much as we deserve.

The Heretics of the Church and Recurring Heresies.

Arius and Arianism.

BY PROFESSOR W. EMERY BARNES, D.D., CAMBRIDGE.

THE early Christians accepted from the Jewish Church the doctrine of the Unity of God. Both our Lord and St. Paul are emphatic in asserting it. Jesus quotes as His own the Jewish confession,

'The Lord our God is one Lord' (Mk 12²⁹); and St. Paul writes to the Corinthians, 'We know that no idol is anything in the world, and that there is no God but one' (1 Co 8⁴). So in the early centuries

the Christian Apologists defiantly asserted the Divine Unity against 'the godless multitude of gods' worshipped by the heathen.

On the other hand, the New Testament contains a history of Jesus which could not fail to arouse discussion as to His relation to the One God. No doubt simple Christians were content to place Jesus beside God the Father of All, and to say with St. Paul: 'To us there is one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we unto him; and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, and we through him' (1 Co 8⁶).

But there remains the challenging title, 'Son of God,' given to Jesus in the New Testament (Mk 3¹¹), and made doubly challenging in the Johannine form, 'Only begotten Son' (τὸν υἱὸν τὸν μονογενῆ: Jn 3¹⁶; cf. v. 18). Moreover, 'Son of God' is impressively used not only in St. Peter's confession (Mt 16¹⁶), but also in the Epistles of St. Paul and in the Epistle to the Hebrews.

But in theological controversy the title 'Son of God,' though quoted from Scripture, could not bring a decision. If it were cited as a proof of the full divinity of Jesus, it could be met by an appeal to other passages of the New Testament, e.g. to Ro 8¹⁴, where men of Christian life and character are called 'Sons of God.' Nor did the word 'God' itself settle the doubt. In the fourth century the Old Testament counted in the Arian controversy as equally authoritative with the New, and the Arian who denied the full Godhead of Jesus could quote as a passage addressed to men, 'I said, *Ye are Gods*, and all sons of the Most High' (Ps 82⁶=81⁶, Septuagint, ἐγὼ εἶπα Θεοὶ ἐστέ καὶ υἱοὶ Ὑψίστου πάντες). In fact, the word Θεός, God, could be used with other than a strictly doctrinal reference, as in the opening words of the 'Second Epistle of Clement' (second century): 'Brethren, thus it behoves us to think of Jesus Christ as we think of God, of the Judge of quick and dead; and it does not behove us to think lightly (μικρὰ φρονεῖν) of our salvation.'

This is the language of practical religion, not of scientific theology.

But Christians who had been educated in the classical learning of their age and were influenced by the teaching of the philosophers could not be content with such a statement. Philosophy was alive and insisted on putting its difficult questions. Rufinus tells us that when the Fathers were assembling for the Council of Nicæa, a distinguished (heathen) dialectician intervened in the discussion of Christian doctrine contending with the Bishops (E.H. i. 3=Sozomen, E.H. i. 18). No true Greek

could bear to be shut out from a discussion which had a philosophical side.

Indeed, Christians could not avoid giving an answer clothed in the terms of philosophy to the philosophers. The question for Christians was, *How far* it was possible to use philosophical terms for the definition of Christian doctrine. Three necessities were laid upon the representative of Christianity; *first*, against heathendom he must assert the Unity of God; *secondly*, to satisfy Christian consciousness he must give due emphasis to the Person of Jesus Christ as Divine; *thirdly*, as against inhuman heathen philosophy he must assert a Living God.

(1) To establish the doctrine of the Unity of God some very crude theories were proposed.

Of these perhaps that which gave most offence to Christian feeling in general and (by a side wind) most help to Arianism was the theory of the Libyan, Sabellius, who taught at Rome at the beginning of the third century. 'God is, according to his teaching, essentially one, and the Trinity which he recognizes is a Trinity not of essence but of revelation; not in the essential relations of the Deity within itself, but in relation to the world outside and to mankind. . . . Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are simply designations of three separate phases under which the one divine essence reveals itself—three names of one and the same being.' 'He (Sabellius) even coined a word *υιοπάτωρ* (Son-Father) to exclude the thought of two beings.' . . . 'There is (in Sabellianism) no real incarnation: no personal indissoluble union of the Godhead with the Manhood took place in Christ. God only manifested Himself in Christ, and when the part was played . . . there ceased to be a Christ or Son of God.'¹

Such doctrines reduced the significance of the Gospels and the story of Christ's life and struck at the root of Christian piety. Yet if an unwary preacher set out to preach the unity of God, he could hardly escape using some expressions which would have a Sabellian sound to the critics of Sabellianism—and they were many. So about the year A.D. 318 Alexander, the Bishop of Alexandria, was publicly accused by Arius (*Αρειος), one of his presbyters, of introducing Sabellianism into a discourse which he was delivering on the Trinity. Thus was the Arian controversy kindled.

The time at which the controversy arose is significant. The year 313 saw imperial edicts of toleration for the Christian Church issued both in the East and in the West. It soon became clear

¹ Bethune-Baker, *Christian Doctrine*, 105 f.

that imperial favour was turning towards the new religion. Heathens began to press into the Church, bringing many heathen presuppositions with them, and Arius had a Christ to offer them who in nature was not unlike a heathen demigod. At the same time he proclaimed that there was but One God in the full sense. The One God stood alone in isolation from Man and from the World. The Son was *not* eternal; he was of a different substance (*ἵσυστάσεως*) or essence (*οὐσίας*) from the Father; he was even liable to change (*τρεπτόν*). Such was the teaching of Arius as we gather it from the anathemas of the Creed of Nicæa. On the other hand, Arians asserted that the Son was created 'out of nothing' and 'out of the will of the Father' in order to distinguish Him, though a creature from all other creatures. And with the same object, though they asserted, 'Once he was not,' they allowed that He was 'born' or 'created' before time began. 'Arius was willing to recognize in the Son of God every dignity compatible with the isolation . . . of the Father.'¹ The title 'Son' meant for the Arians chiefly that the Son was 'subsequent' to the Father. 'We are persecuted,' writes Arius to Eusebius, Bishop of Nicomedia, 'because we said, *The Son hath beginning* (*ἀρχήν*), *but God is without beginning*' (*ὁ δὲ Θεὸς ἀναρχὸς ἐστι*: Theodoret, *E.H.* i. 5).

The Nicene doctrine has been criticised for 'substituting the subtleties of philosophy (e.g. *homo-ousion*, "of one substance") for the simplicity of the earlier Christian confession.' A similar criticism can be more justly passed on the Arianism of Arius. He argues that since God is *incorporeal* (*ἀσώματος*) the title 'the Father' has no natural meaning, and he proceeds to empty the title 'the Son' of its content. The confession which Arius and his sympathizers presented to his bishop (Alexander), *circ.* A.D. 321, actually avoids the word 'Father': it begins, 'We know one God, One only Unbegotten, alone eternal, alone without beginning, alone true God (*ἀληθινόν*), alone having immortality,' etc. etc.² Here is philosophy indeed, but has it any religious appeal?

Arius was not a wilful innovator. He did not claim to be bringing forward some newer and more correct statement of doctrine, but only to be reproducing that which he had been taught in earlier years. Indeed, the short and simply worded creeds which were taught in different places to candidates for Baptism were ambiguous and could be understood in an Arian sense. When Arius

presents his confession to Alexander, he introduces it in the words: 'Our creed (*πίστις*), our ancestral creed, which we learned also from thee, O blessed Pope (*μακάριε πάπα*) is this.' He and his supporters were confident, it seems, that his doctrine would be accepted at Nicæa. But disappointment awaited them. The Council was not ready as yet to accept the 'unscriptural' terms recommended by the Athanasian party, but when 'a certain few' bishops brought forward an Arianizing creed, the other bishops at once tore it to pieces, calling it 'spurious and tricky' (*εὐθέως διέρρηξαν ἅπαντες, νόθον καὶ κίβδηλον ὀνομάσαντες*: Theodoret, *E.H.* i. 7). The Arians for their part were trying to introduce unscriptural terms in order to emphasize the distinction of the Son from the Father.

There was a fundamental defect in Arian doctrine, in that it outraged Christian feeling. While Arius was insisting on the difference between the Father and the Son, Christian faith was resting on the reality of their relationship, and Christian feeling was responding instinctively to the challenge of St. Paul, 'He that spared not his own Son (*τοῦ ἰδίου υἱοῦ*), but delivered him up for us all, how shall he not also with him freely give us all things?'

The Nicene Fathers by a very great majority responded to Christian feeling and, eschewing Arian philosophizing, they surrendered to the lead of the Athanasian party. The historian Eusebius of Cæsarea had laid before the council the creed which was taught to candidates for baptism in his city. This the Fathers now took, and, keeping the substance of it, they introduced into it certain clauses which contradicted Arian doctrine.

Two of these contain the Greek word *οὐσία*, which is translated 'substance' in the English versions of the Creed. But *οὐσία*, like 'substance,' can be used of that which is material, whereas God is spirit. Objection was taken to the word in the fourth century, but in each case it is defended by Athanasius. The Fathers declared in their Creed, *first*, that the Son is 'of the substance' or 'essence' of the Father (*ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας*), and *secondly*, that the Son is 'of one substance with the Father' or 'one in essence with the Father' (*ὁμοούσιον, homo-ousion*). 'Let no one be startled,' writes Athanasius, 'on hearing that the Son of God is from the Essence of the Father; but rather let him accept the explanation of the Fathers. . . . For they considered it the same thing to say that the Word was "of God" and "of the essence of God," since the word "God," as I have already said, signifies nothing but the essence of Him Who is' (*De Decretis*, 22). Again he writes (*De Decretis*,

¹ Gwatkin, *Studies of Arianism*, 24.

² Hahn, *Symbole*, 188.

24): 'Further, let every corporeal inference be banished on this subject: and transcending every imagination of sense, let us with pure understanding and with mind alone, apprehend the genuine relation of son to father, and the Word's proper relation towards God, and the unvarying likeness of the radiance towards the light: for, as the words "Offspring" (γέννημα) and "Son" bear, and are meant to bear, no human sense, but one suitable to God, in like manner when we hear the phrase "one in essence" (τὴν λέξιν τοῦ ὁμοουσίου), let us not fall upon human senses, and imagine partitions and divisions (μερισμοὺς καὶ διαίρεσεις), but as having our thoughts directed to things immaterial, let us preserve undivided the oneness of nature and the identity of light' (τὴν ταυτότητα τοῦ φωτός).¹

Surely the Nicene doctrine thus explained by Athanasius is more Christian than the Arian assertion of the unlikeness of Father and Son, surely it agrees better with the faith which the plain Christian man draws from the four Gospels.

The discussions at Nicæa were limited (so far as we know) to the nature of the Son and his relation to the Father. Concerning the Holy Spirit no fresh pronouncement was made: the (true) Nicene Creed admitted no addition to the simple form of belief 'in the Holy Spirit.' But Arius, with his zeal for maintaining the Unity of the Godhead, was prepared to resist any assertions that might be made of the personality and true deity of the Spirit. His statements, as Athanasius (*Or. c. Arian.*, i. § 6) gives them, are vehement denials: 'The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are altogether unlike one another (ἀνόμοιοι πάμπαν ἀλλήλων) both in their substances ("essences," οὐσίαις) and in their glories' (δόξαις). 'The Arian Trinity of divine Persons forms a descending series separated by infinite degrees of honour and glory,' is Professor Gwatkin's comment.²

Arianism was defeated, but not crushed, at Nicæa. For there were Arians and Arians, and many who bore the name had the saving grace of missionary zeal. Arian teachers converted the barbarians—Goths, Vandals, and Lombards—who conquered the Roman Empire, and Ulfilas, the translator of the Bible into Gothic and one of the greatest missionaries of ancient times (fourth century), was an Arian. Probably these apostolic men would be more accurately described as Conservatives, *i.e.* as Christians who because they

disliked the new term *homo-ousion* were too hastily styled Arians by their Nicene opponents. For men who refused the theological language of Athanasius would not necessarily accept that of Arius.

What was it, then, that gave vitality to the conservative form of Arianism? Surely it was that it preserved for the simple and unlearned the distinctness of outline of the person of the Lord Jesus, which the *homo-ousion* seemed to blur for them. The Saviour who is shown in the Gospel of St. Luke who perseveres in prayer to His Father, the Son who declares in St. John, 'The Father is greater than I,' and again who asks, 'The cup which the Father hath given me, shall I not drink it?' seems to be indistinctly portrayed in the terms of Nicene orthodoxy—at least when these are isolated from their context. The missionary in presenting the person of the Christ to his hearers would naturally use the strong appeal of the concrete language of the Evangelists and at the same time avoid any ill-timed introduction of the *homo-ousion*.

The Renaissance and the Reformation led to a revival of the controversy between the Athanasians and the Arians. At last the Scriptures could be printed and published in many languages, including the chief vernaculars of Europe, and it became an easy task both for the learned and also for the unlearned to bring the doctrines of the Church to the test of scriptural proof. No doctrine however mysterious and fundamental in the eyes of the theologians could escape critical examination. When the authority of the Church herself was challenged, we need not be surprised that the authorized doctrine of the Trinity was put to the test of comparison with the utterances of the Scriptures.

Indeed, the great contrast which exists between the terms taken in post-Nicene times to represent Nicene orthodoxy on the one side, and the language of the Four Gospels on the other, has remained as a justification of the conservative form of Arianism through the ages. To Anglican churchmen the terms *Person* and *Substance* and *Trinity* and *Unity* have come from an anonymous Latin composition of the fifth century (*Quicumque vult*), not from the pages of St. Mark or St. John. The contrast between the language of *Quicumque* and that of the Gospels is startling, and it gives a shock to read in Article VIII. (Articles of Religion, 1571): *Symbola tria, Nicaenum, Athanasii* (*i.e.* *Quicumque vult*), *et quod vulgo Apostolorum appellatur omnino recipienda sunt et credenda; nam firmissimis Scripturarum testimoniis probari possunt.*

¹ Henry Wace and Philip Schaff, *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, iv. 165 f.

² *Studies of Arianism*, 27.

It was sheer provocation to many Christian men to tell them that the scholastic terms of *Quicumque vult* could be proved most certainly from the non-scholastic language of the Scriptures—*firmissimis Scripturarum testimoniis*.

Imagine this statement being brought to the mind of Milton—the mind which valued ‘the liberty to argue freely above all other liberties.’ Its weakness in logic could not fail to strike him. And Milton was not only a logician, but also a poet. As a poet he must allow his mind to move more freely than dogmatic formulas would permit. Poetry requires the interplay of differing human characters: the interaction of Father and Son in the Christian Trinity could hardly be represented truly even in as great a poem as *Paradise Lost*. The mystery is too great.

Milton in his poem keeps close to the ‘Conservative’ position. Several passages may be quoted from Book III. to show that he held the doctrine of the Subordination of the Son, but *not* the tenet that the Son is ‘unlike’ (ἀνόμοιος) the Father in essence. He ascribes full honour to the Son in lines 138–140:

Beyond compare the Son of God was seen
Most glorious, in him all his Father shon¹
Substantially express’d.

And in lines 169 f. the Father’s address:

. . . Son, who art alone
My word, my wisdom, and effectual might,

has in it more of Athanasius than of Arius.

Dependence and Subordination to the Father are expressed in the lines 243, 244:

. . . Thou hast givn² me to possess
Life in myself for ever; by Thee I live, . . .

rather than the doctrine of the Eternal Generation of the Son.

Finally, Milton departs far from the *homo-ousion* in the lines addressed by the Father to the Son (308 ff.):

[Thou] hast been found

By merit more than Birthright Son of God;
Found worthiest to be so by being Good
Farr² more then² Great or High.

In *Paradise Lost* the needs of poetry sometimes obscure the expression of dogma, but Milton’s real views are clearly expressed in his posthumous work

¹ Spelling according to H. C. Beeching’s edition, after the original texts, Oxford, 1913.

² Original spelling.

on *Christian Doctrine*.³ There, under the heading, *Eternal Generation of the Son*, he first quotes nine passages from the New Testament, and then pronounces judgment as follows: ‘All these passages prove the existence of the Son before the world was made, but they conclude nothing respecting his generation from all eternity’ (p. 83).

In an earlier passage of the same work (pp. 25 ff.), Milton quotes eleven texts from the Old Testament which assert the unity of God, and continues: ‘And thus the Israelites under the law and the prophets always understood [the First Commandment] to mean, that God was numerically one God, that beside him there was none other, much less any equal. For those disputants of the schools had not yet appeared, who, depending on their own sagacity, or rather on arguments of a purely contradictory tendency, cast a doubt upon that very unity of God which they pretended to assert.’

The testimony of the New Testament, Milton adds, proves that the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is that one God (p. 26). As to the sense in which God the Father can have begotten the Son, ‘This point,’ Milton says, ‘will be easily explained by reference to Scripture’ (p. 87). ‘God of his own WILL created or generated, or produced (*creavit sive generavit aut produxit*)⁴, the Son before all things, endued with the divine nature, as in the fulness of time he miraculously begat him in his human nature of the Virgin Mary . . . God imparted to the Son as much as he pleased of the divine nature, nay, of the divine substance itself, *modo ne substantia pro essentia tota accipiatur*.’⁵

Here, in the assertion that the Son is created of the Will of the Father and that he is not wholly divine, Milton is in agreement with the Arians of the fourth century.

Milton wrote his *de Doctrina* in Latin, and did not publish his work, and so it is improbable that it had any influence on the Arian Movement of the beginning of the eighteenth century. On the other hand, it is possible that a pregnant phrase from *Paradise Lost* may have moved some to question current belief, ‘By Merit more than Birthright Son

³ *A Treatise on Christian Doctrine compiled from the Holy Scriptures alone*, translated from the original by Charles R. Sumner, M.A. Printed at the Cambridge University Press, 1825.

⁴ Johannis Miltoni Angli, *De Doctrina Christiana Libri duo posthumi*, quos ex schedis manuscriptis deprompsit. . . . C. R. S., A.M., Cantabrigiae, MDCCCXXV.

⁵ ‘Only let us not understand substance as equivalent to the whole essence.’

of God.' But however this may be, it is probable that the old difficulty which the 'Conservatives' felt at Nicæa was still the main source of trouble. The special terms in which Churchmen sought to define the relation of the Son to the Father were not to be found in Scripture. The fact had given rise to a discussion in Convocation in 1689 over *Quicumque vult*, the so-called Athanasian Creed, but the matter had been shelved, and the question remained unanswered. Could such definitions be reconciled with Scripture?

Discussion was re-opened (and just from this question) in 1712. Dr. SAMUEL CLARKE, Rector of St. James's, Westminster, and Chaplain in Ordinary to Her MAJESTY (Queen Anne), published a work called *The Scripture-Doctrine of the Trinity*. There is a challenge in the title: the Author is thinking that many hold a non-Scriptural Doctrine. But Clarke quotes with approval the saying of 'the excellent Mr. Chillingworth,' that 'the Bible, I say, the BIBLE only, is the Religion of Protestants.' 'But,' says Dr. Clarke, 'the Church has out of Scripture selected those plain fundamental doctrines which were of necessity to be known by all Christians . . . These all persons were taught in their *Baptismal Creed*.' But 'as men grew less pious and more contentious . . . they enlarged¹ their Creeds, and grew more minute in determining unnecessary controversies.'

The first part of Dr. Clarke's work consists of an extensive collection (and 'explication') of texts from the New Testament regarding (a) God the Father; (b) the Son of God; (c) the Holy Spirit. His first quotation, significant of much that is to follow, is of Mt 19¹⁷ (A.V.), 'Why callest thou me good? there is none good, but *One* (εἷς, *One Person*), that is, God.' In Part ii. he sums up in several Propositions the doctrine which he gathers from these passages. These Propositions are marked by their avoidance of the word *Trinity* and by their large divergence from *Quicumque vult*.

After asserting in Proposition I. that 'There is *One* Supreme Cause and Original of Things; One simple, uncompounded, undivided, intelligent Being, or Person; who is the Author of all Being, and the Fountain of all Power,' Clarke proceeds to state that 'With This *First* and Supreme Cause or Father of all Things there has existed from the Beginning, a *Second* divine Person, which is his *Word* or *Son*.' The Third Proposition runs, 'With the Father and the Son, there has existed from the Beginning, a *Third* divine Person, which is the *Spirit* of the Father and of the Son.' These three Propositions

¹ Sic.

depart far from *Quicumque vult*. They represent God the Father as the ἀρχή, the Beginning of All, and as the πηγή, the Fountain of Deity. So Proposition IX. declares that 'The Scripture, when it mentions the *One God*, or the *Only God*, always means the *Supreme Person of the Father*.' In a note Clarke refers to the seventeen passages from the New Testament which he quoted at the beginning of Part i. (pp. 1-7).

In Proposition IV. we come to a definite declaration that the Church's treatment of the Doctrine of the Trinity is unscriptural. Clarke writes, 'What the proper Metaphysical *Nature, Essence, or Substance* of any of these divine Persons is, the Scripture has nowhere at all declared; but describes and distinguishes them always, by their *Personal Characters, Offices, Powers, and Attributes*.'

This statement, though true in general, is not true in every particular. A conspicuous exception is the case of Heb 1³ (R.V.m.), where the Son is described as 'the very image of his (*i.e.* the Father's, God's) substance' or 'the impress of his substance' (χαρακτήρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ). This is surely metaphysical language. Still in the vast majority of passages of the New Testament the terms used are popular and pictorial. The word *Trinity* is not used in Scripture, nor the phrase *Three Persons*. Though *Father, Son, and Holy Spirit* are mentioned together, no statement is made of their mutual relation. They are to be regarded as *one* in agreement, because they work together in their several functions, and not as one in substance or essence. Thus the Trinity which (according to Dr. Clarke) can be proved from the Scriptures of the New Testament is an Economic Trinity, which we know through spiritual experience and not by theory.

The Arian Controversy of the early eighteenth century in England had a history different from that of the fourth century in the Roman Empire. The later Arians did not claim to be the only true exponents of the doctrine of the Church. All that they demanded was the liberty (a large liberty!) that when they subscribed to the Thirty-Nine Articles, they might put upon them such interpretations as Dr. Clarke and his friends gave them. A war of pamphlets followed. The Arian demand was answered by 'Daniel Waterland, D.D., Master of Magdalen College, in Cambridge,' in a booklet of sixty-nine pages, entitled *The Case of Arian Subscription considered*, and the several Pleas and Excuses for it particularly Examined and Confuted (1721). Other literary broadsides were exchanged, but the controversy died down. No

change was made in the conditions of Subscription, but Dr. Clarke was left undisturbed in his living. There was no need to call for a General Council. *Nicaea locuta est : causa finita est.*

Christians who believe that 'God fulfils Himself in many ways' will not be indiscriminate in their condemnation of 'Arianism.' Men who were

called Arians did noble missionary work in early days, and Eusebius of Cæsarea and Samuel Clarke of St. James, Westminster, 'who confessed the Father and the Son,' though imperfect as theologians, may be numbered with the saints. Eusebius lives as a great Christian advocate, Samuel Clarke as a faithful parish priest.

In the Study.

Virginibus Puerisque.

An Address for Armistice Day.

BY THE REVEREND F. A. FARLEY, M.A., B.D.,
BLACKPOOL.

'With the jeopardy of their lives they brought it.'—
1 CH II¹⁹.

You will all remember how popular David became with the people when he slew the giant Goliath, whom all the warriors of Israel had feared. And you will also remember that, because of that popularity, and in spite of the fact that David's music had often cheered him in his depression and sullen tempers, King Saul became very jealous of David, and David had to seek refuge among the bare hills. 'There he lived with those who cared to share with him in the hardships of that exile—some of them were men in debt, others had committed some great wrong, and for these reasons they were glad to find some place where they could be safe from those who pursued them. Others were brave men, loyal to David, who looked for the time when he would be their king, and would drive the invading Philistines from their land. Whatever their characters had been before they joined David, and although they had to live as outlaws, and almost as brigands, yet David kept them under good discipline. They were never allowed to harm the weak, or to take what food they needed from the hard-working farmers of their own people. If they needed corn or a sheep they must raid the Philistines' camp, or seek their food from some wealthy man in return for their protection of his lands from the enemy.

For all that it was a wild life they led, and a hard one. The hills were bare even of grass. They could not move this way, because Saul's soldiers were waiting for them; and they could not move that way, because the Philistines were eager to

catch them. In the hot, rainless season there was no water near at hand, the cave where they hid and lived was very close, and often they were thirsty as well as hungry.

On one such day David stood at the mouth of the cave with parched lips, and as he looked out towards Bethlehem, the village in which he was born and which he loved so well, but which was now in the hands of the Philistines, a longing came to his lips, and he said, 'Oh, that one would bring me water from the well of Bethlehem!' But that was impossible. The enemy had that village, and what they would guard most securely was the well on which they depended for their water. But brave men often do the impossible. Three of his followers heard David express his wish, and when night came they stole out of their cave, passed the Philistines' sentries, went right into the village, filled a flask with water from the well, and then turned to go back. Again they had watchfully to pass the sentries, but this they did, and safely reached their stronghold again.

Then they brought to their great leader the drink he had longed for. Still his lips were parched. He looked at the water and saw its sparkle and freshness, but he saw something else as well. He saw his men taking their lives in their hands to quench his thirst, and though he longed to drink he felt that that water was too costly and too sacred for him to drink. So he poured it out as an offering to God, for, said he, 'With the jeopardy of their lives they brought it.'

You may think the three heroes were very disappointed when they saw the water poured out on to the ground, but then they, too, would think that that was a way to offer it to God, and they would know how much David valued their courage. And David felt that if he drank that water it would choke him.

'With the jeopardy of their lives they brought it.' We can, and must, say that to-day, about our lives and our freedom and our peace. It was all bought for us at a great cost and sacrifice. How shall we use it all? Shall we just enjoy it carelessly, without thought of those by whose sacrifice all was won. Or shall we also, seeing how sacred life and peace now are to us, 'pour them out unto the Lord'? That is all we can do. But we have learnt better ways of making offerings to God. What we must do is to live our lives unto God, preserve and use this costly peace to the glory of God. And the glory of God is always the good of men—of all men.

Our very lives, and this peace which we enjoy, are sacred unto the Lord. They were bought with a great price. We must use them as God wants them used. 'For with the jeopardy of their lives they brought it.'

The Miracle Tunnel.

BY THE REVEREND R. OSWALD DAVIES, LEICESTER.

'We are more than conquerors.'—Ro 8⁹⁷.

1. On July 18 of this year (1934) His Majesty the King visited the city of Liverpool. Before the royal dais there stood an immense fan-like arrangement, beautifully coloured. At a given moment, the King pressed a button; the fan opened, and disclosed the portal of the Mersey Tunnel. It was Liverpool's wonder tunnel. Tunnels we have known before; but they were made for steam-engines. They are dark, and generally full of smoke. This tunnel has been made for the motor-car. It is lit by 2500 lamps, and is, indeed, beautiful.

As you glide along this iron road, it is like moving down the aisle of some immense cathedral, only the aisle is $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles long! This tunnel links up the two great centres of Liverpool and Birkenhead. It goes beneath the river Mersey, over the waters of which pass the ships of the world. It is the largest under-water tunnel in the world. It is so large that 4150 cars can pass through it in one hour, four lines of cars being able to travel through it together at the rate of 20 miles an hour.

How thrilling it must be to drive in at Liverpool, travel along this illuminated highway for $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and emerge at Birkenhead. What a mighty task and what a mighty achievement was the building of this amazing tunnel! Those men of Liverpool and Birkenhead carefully made their calculations; they said, 'It can be done. It shall be done!' And on July 18 it *was* done. Thus are all great tasks performed. It is faith and courage which are the

secret of all great achievements. The conquerors in every realm of life have been men of great faith. William Wilberforce went on unflinchingly with his fight against slavery until he had won. Ronald Ross never gave up until he had tracked down the cause of malaria. Wilfred Grenfell faced the rigours of Labrador so as to bring hope and healing to the Eskimo people. Above all, our Lord Jesus 'set his face stedfastly towards Jerusalem' though it meant the Cross, because it was the only way to conquer men's hearts. Learn this lesson early in life. Don't be afraid of difficulties. Cultivate faith and courage; and thus get yourselves ready for life's great tasks.

2. Again, the Mersey Tunnel was not made without tremendous cost. In money, it has cost over £7,000,000. In time, it has cost over eight years. Here are some interesting facts about the material that was put into it. There were used 82,000 tons of cast-iron lining; 140 miles of lead caulking; 560,000 pounds of explosive; a million bolts; 270,000 tons of concrete; 600 miles of cabling; 2500 light fittings; and 94 alarm-boxes and telephones. That will give you some idea of its tremendous cost. Neither must we forget the men who daily risked their lives in the darkness to make this great achievement possible. As the King graciously said: 'May those who use it ever keep grateful thought of the many who struggled for long months against wind and darkness to bring it into being.'

Everything that is worth while is based on sacrifice. Your homes were built on it. Your parents are daily sacrificing themselves for you. And the Church to which we belong is built upon the great sacrifice of Jesus Christ. We, too, must learn to sacrifice. Start by giving up little things, and later you will be able to sacrifice big things.

3. Finally, the Mersey Tunnel was opened by the King. In the presence of a large concourse of people he declared it open. Not only that, he went through it himself, and became a forerunner of the many thousands who will use it for generations to come.

We think, too, of our King the Lord Jesus Christ as our forerunner in all things. Never shall we come to some dark place on life's road without knowing that our King has gone before us, and has somehow lighted the way for us.

And when He left this world He went through the tunnel of Death Himself. 'I go to prepare a place for you,' He said, 'that where I am ye shall be also.'

So to-day we face the tunnel of Death cheerfully

and buoyantly, because the King Himself has gone through it and lighted it with the unfailing light of another world. Through Him we, too, can be conquerors.

The Christian Year.

TWENTY-FIRST SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.

Healing.

'There was a certain nobleman, whose son was sick at Capernaum. . . . Jesus saith unto him, Go thy way; thy son liveth.'—Jn 4⁴⁶⁻⁵⁰.

'And a certain man was there, which had an infirmity thirty and eight years. . . . Jesus saith unto him, Rise, take up thy bed, and walk.'—Jn 5⁵⁻⁸.

St. Paul very seldom uses 'sins' in the plural; he is concerned with 'sin.' It is a gigantic evil, which he treats almost as a malignant person, a horrible tyrant who wants to lord it over us. 'Sins' are a series of separate acts or thoughts or feelings that are wrong. 'Sin' is a condition of disease, which shows itself partly, but not entirely, in definite 'sins.' All sin is ill-health, weakness, failure, lack of spiritual vitality, which we have contracted by our own fault. In so far as it is not due to our own fault, it is not sin. Sin and the new life that Christ brings are as opposite to one another as sickness and health.

This is symbolized in two signs that St. John gives us: a nobleman's son was sick at Capernaum; and an old man had lain helpless for thirty-eight years at the pool of Bethesda. And the Lord healed them both, that is, restored them to health. And health is what the new life is.

We can use these two persons, the boy and the old man, to draw three contrasts, which will cover a large part of mankind.

1. *The one was young and the other was old.* The boy was attacked with a sudden illness, probably something infectious caught from another child or young man. The old man had been paralysed for years. Sin, spiritual disease, in the young and in the old is to a large extent different. The young, in their beautiful, springing vitality, feel the pressure of all the instincts rising fresh and insurgent within them. Everything is new and untried, and they want to try everything. The strength of their instincts is as strong as heredity can make it, while the strength of their spiritual life has not yet had time to grow, as it has had in an older person. Their minds are plastic and susceptible to every influence alike. Their soul, like their body, catches infectious diseases much more easily. There are,

of course, exceptions; but, broadly speaking, the influences in which a child is placed will largely mould him for good or for bad; and the bad more easily than the good. One influence—for good or evil—we must take into account which applies especially to the young men and women of college or business age. It is difficult to describe it more exactly than to say that it is the general atmosphere of the age. Let Christ use the spirit of the time, the atmosphere of the age, that in it He may lead them to His service, and by His life heal what is diseased.

Again, the sins of the young are, humanly speaking, easier to heal than those of the old. Some of the instincts, which to the young are a hostile army, begin to lose their power in old age. But there is one that is often dominant and increasingly hostile—the instinct of self-assertion. The old have the experience of life, they have control of the money, they have the position of authority. They expect to be respected, and consulted and treated with deference. That is right and natural, but it has its dangers, from which the young are mostly free. As we grow older, the word 'I' is apt to grow a bigger letter on the page of our thoughts.

The old have more frequent, or more permanent, ailments and weaknesses of the body. Hence irritability, peevishness, crotchets, self-centredness. Why they are sometimes 'difficult' here receives an explanation but not an excuse. For many old people, too, life is not as interesting and exciting as it used to be. And when conversation begins to be duller and less amusing, it sometimes degenerates into gossip, finding fault with people, criticising them, running them down. Another thing is that, like the weakness of the man who had been paralysed for thirty-eight years, what sins they have are mostly long-engrained habits. And they nearly all arise from the habit of putting self first. Jealousy is one form of it. But there is no habit too old for Christ to heal. The new life that He brings can rush into them, and make, not their bodies, but their souls young again. He does it by increasing their love for Him and for men and women, their sympathy, their tenderness, their self-forgetfulness. If it is not I that live, but Christ liveth in me—Christ who never grows old—then my spirit can remain eternally young.

2. A contrast between the two patients is seen in the fact that *one of them was rich*, the nobleman's son, *the other was poor*. Rich and poor can symbolize the difference of opportunities that people have in the spiritual life. The chief thing that we must remember is the richness of our own opportunities.

We need not dwell long on the contrast between rich and poor ; but it is worth while to kneel down, and think what we might have been with the riches that God has given us, and ask Him to show us how we can use them better.

3. And then the third contrast. *The man at the pool could speak to Christ Himself ; the nobleman's son did not see Him at all.* Part of the richness of our opportunity is that we have learnt to pray for ourselves. We can get the relief of telling our Heavenly Father what is the matter with us ; we can tell Him of our selfishness, our waste of opportunities, our insincerities.

See how the poor old man was healed. The principle was the same as in the cure of Naaman's leprosy. The prophet did not strike his hand over the place and recover the leper by magic ; he told him to do something. What Christ said, in effect, was : It is not for Me to cure you in spite of yourself. Rise, take up your bed, and walk. It was the power of God, accepted and used by the man, that cured him ; and it was his trust in Jesus that made him accept and use the power.

That is where we fail. We are offered the whole power of God, and we often fail to accept it, and lie on in our miserable paralysis. 'I can do all things through Christ that putteth power into me.' That is much nearer the meaning of St. Paul's Greek words than the Authorized Version. This engrained habit of self-centredness, which we may have been making more and more engrained with the passing of the years—we *can* be free from it, we *can* rise up and walk and lose our paralysis, because the Divine power is given us.

And in contrast with the man who could pray for himself, there was the boy at a distance from our Lord, needing to be prayed for. Part of our release from self-centredness is to pray for those who cannot pray for themselves ; for those whose surroundings make it virtually impossible to know anything about prayer or about a God to pray to ; for those who, if they have ever prayed, have long given it up ; for the heathen who have never heard of the love of Him who came to heal them. And what is to prevent us from praying for those who have gone, with no love for God, as far as we can see, and no repentance, that, if possible, they may have further rich opportunities of repentance and love ? The nobleman's son, who needed to be prayed for, can symbolize them all. Who can measure the wealth of our opportunities of bringing the new life offered by Christ to bear upon the souls of men ?¹

¹ A. H. McNeile, *Alive unto God*, 24.

TWENTY-SECOND SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.

Until Seventy Times Seven.

'Jesus saith unto him, I say not unto thee, Until seven times : but, Until seventy times seven.'—Mt 18²².

Christ could not endure either the love of money or the spirit of revenge. Christian opinion to-day is disposed to treat them less seriously. The modern Church, for example, does not condemn a man who is plainly too fond of riches as it condemns a man who is plainly too fond of drink. Few Christians, again, would recoil from bearing malice as they would recoil from telling lies.

In one sense, of course, the ancient *lex talionis*—an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth—is instinctive in human nature. When any one harms us or wrongs us, our first impulse is to pay him back in his own coin. Yet when we watch the effects of such a spirit, we recognize the miserable folly of harbouring this sense of personal grievance. Nothing warps and sours the heart like self-pity, when we feel ourselves badly used. It has been said quite truly, if somewhat bluntly, that God Almighty has no use for a man with a grievance. Moreover, when once we allow our resentment room to fester in the soul, it will find utterance and be inflamed and aggravated by expression.

The sweetness of revenge entered into some heathen ideals of paradise. The Norseman imagined Valhalla as a banqueting hall, where warriors drank mead out of the skulls of their conquered foes. We turn away shuddering from that savage picture, when we remember another place which was called Golgotha—the place of a skull—and listen to the voice of the Crucified : 'I say unto you, love your enemies, bless them that curse you, pray for them that despitefully use you.' If such words have any meaning, then, so long as we permit ourselves to cherish bitter and revengeful feelings against any human being, we are living in a state of wilful sin. Christ bids us every night to pray the prayer of the little child : 'Forgive me my trespasses, as I forgive them that trespass against me.' And He requires us to go on forgiving our brothers, though they sin against us until seventy times seven.

Our Lord's precept about inexhaustible forgiveness was spoken in an ancient Syrian village. We can hardly imagine how amazing and impossible His words must have sounded, when He first bade men love their very enemies. It may be urged, indeed, that the doctrine of forbearance was peculiarly needed by men like the Zealots of Galilee, with hot Eastern blood in their veins. Yet was

their temperament more prone to evil than the dark, sullen anger which belongs to Northern nations? To-day the struggle for existence still kindles fierce enmity among those who are competing in every trade and industry. Surely the most supernatural work which our Lord ever undertook was to teach us how to feel affection for our rivals, to bless our persecutors, to pray for our foes.

Now before we can grasp the scope of this great commandment, we must realize, first of all, that Christ does not bid us be on good terms with the enemies of the human race. When, for instance, we come across people who make a trade out of their neighbours' vices, people who torment dumb creatures or little children, people who defraud the poor, we understand how unselfish anger can become a most urgent and awful duty. The one person whom Christ insists that we must forgive is the person who has trespassed against us personally—the man who cheats us in business, or slanders our character, or insults our dignity, or abuses our confidence, or is thankless for our kindness. And this personal offence is precisely the hard thing to pardon: because the essence of the injury is that it hurts our pride.

Perhaps the sin which destroys more souls than any other is the sin of wounded pride. George MacDonald reminds us that our Lord has spoken of two sins which cannot be forgiven, because they involve a spiritual condition in us which will allow no forgiveness to enter, and so they shut out God's mercy. And one of these sins is enmity against our neighbour. 'If God said, "I forgive you," to a man who hated his brother, and if (as is impossible) that voice of forgiveness should reach the man, how would he interpret it? Would it not mean to him, "You may go on hating"?'

Just because it is pride which ultimately hinders us from forgiving the brother who wrongs us, Christ has bound up such forgiveness on our part with our own pardon by God. When we come to confess our sins against the Father of spirits, pride breaks down and crumbles away. In the All-Holy Presence, we must bring ourselves face to face with every one who is indebted to us. We must see them in the light in which the Father Himself sees them and us together. We must judge them, as we humbly pray Him to judge us. We must love them, because we know that He loves us all alike. 'Forgive us,' we whisper, 'as we also forgive.' It is not that we hold up our mercifulness as a standard for the Divine mercy: it is that we bind ourselves, because God is forgiving our many debts, to offer this sacrifice

of peace and thanksgiving in that we also forgive our debtors.

Our Lord's unfathomable words about ceaseless, tireless mercy, about absolute forgiveness, about the duty not of tolerating but of actually loving our enemies, point to a miraculous virtue that resides in compassion which is like Christ's own compassion—which never gives up, and never grows weary, and so has Divine power to subdue the unthankful and the evil at last. Christ will have us know that there is a latent spiritual energy in pure, persistent affection, such as we have no courage to believe in yet. For it is true, as a modern teacher declares, that faith and hope and charity only become saving virtues when they are exercised *in extremis*, or, rather, *in excelsis*. Faith is not dull acquiescence: it means believing the incredible, trusting utterly in goodness when every one and everything conspire to impeach it and deny it. Hope is not vague cheerfulness: it means expecting the impossible, holding out confident to the very last in the face of despair. And charity is not genial good nature: it means pardoning the unpardonable, loving the unlovely—loving them in spite of ingratitude even unto the end. And this charity never faileth: it shares the victories and conquests of Almighty Love.¹

TWENTY-THIRD SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.

The Spirit of Christianity.

'God hath not given us the spirit of fear; but of power, and of love, and of a sound mind.'—2 Ti 1⁷.

The question which is settled for us by these words of Scripture is a very important one, and a very practical one. With every function which a human being is called upon to fulfil in this world, whether that function be assigned to him by the direct act of Divine Providence or assumed by him through the exercise of his own free-will, we are accustomed to associate the idea of what we call a certain 'spirit.' We enter into the 'spirit' of any enterprise, as the saying is, when, having formed a good idea of the object in view, we endeavour to realize it to the best of our abilities, and as the circumstances require. Sympathy with the purpose of an undertaking, and enthusiasm for its promotion, are demanded from those who would embrace it in the right 'spirit.'

Now the Christian life is a vocation. It has a character all its own, which distinguishes it from other ways of living. It consists of certain wonderful

T. H. Darlow, *Holy Ground*, 163.

privileges, and involves certain definite obligations. Hence there pertains to it a 'spirit,' in relation to which, as to a standard, every Christian life, as it is lived, takes rank in the scale of worthiness. The degree in which we are faithful to the perfect idea of what we should be determines the quality of our Christianity. And what the Apostle does in this sentence of his letter to Timothy is to describe the 'spirit' of our Christian calling. He is thinking, no doubt, primarily of the office of the ministry. But what he says has a more general application as well. The character or temper in keeping with our profession as Christian men and women is not the spirit of 'fear,' but of 'power, and love, and a sound mind.' That spirit, which manifests itself in these three ways, he bids us 'stir up,' or 'fan into a flame.'

The Christian life, as we are all very well aware, has two sides—an inner and an outward. Viewed on its inner side, it consists of a conscious, personal relationship to God through Jesus Christ. 'Ye received the spirit of adoption,' the Apostle writes, 'whereby we cry, "Abba, Father."' The footing on which we now stand towards God, that is to say, the true conception of our relationship to Him, is that of children to a Father. But, in this letter to Timothy, Paul has in view the Christian life not on its inward but on its outward side. He is surveying the Christian as he stands face to face with the world and human society.

At the same time, we should be careful to observe that it is not with the general subject of the qualities which ought to be manifested in a Christian's outward life that the Apostle is here concerned. In other words, he does not set himself to give an exhaustive account of the Christian graces and virtues. He simply describes the true 'spirit' of the Christian life in contrast with a particular false 'spirit'—the spirit of 'fearfulness.' His description is therefore limited by the temper which he wishes to repudiate. In contrast with, say, the 'spirit' of selfishness or joylessness, he would have named other qualities than those of 'power, and love, and soundness of mind.' Why he selects 'fearfulness' is easily explained. Timothy, 'his dearly beloved son,' as he calls him, was evidently prone to 'fearfulness.' In proof of this statement we have not only the language of the present letter to go on, but the interesting fact also that when there were troublesome matters to be settled in the Church at Corinth, Paul did not dispatch Timothy to deal with them, but sent Titus as the stronger man. There was no question about Timothy's faith. But there was a timidity, a strain of 'fearful-

ness' in his character, which was quite out of keeping with the true Christian temper.

We are all sensible that there is much in our conduct that is inconsistent with our vocation as Christian men and women. And one of the most fertile sources of specific and conspicuous acts of disloyalty is just our susceptibility to 'fearfulness.' 'Fear and Gain,' says William Penn, 'are great perverters of mankind.' We are afraid to put our foot down: we hide our colours as if they were rags to be ashamed of. Cowardice constrains us to wink at things said and done in our presence. Our silence is taken for approval, and we become compromised before we know what has happened.

The 'spirit' of Christianity is a 'spirit of power.' However strong and however seductive the influences may be to which we are exposed, we have resources in God able to overcome them. It is sometimes said that the greatest need of the age is for men and women with some distinction of personality about them. There are plenty of people whose intentions are good, and whose lives are gangrened with no flagrant faults. But the impression conveyed by too many is that their principles are perpetually in a fluid condition. They are not to be counted on; their characters run to flabbiness. And yet a bracing and clear-cut individuality ought to be inseparable from the profession of Christianity.

As opposed, then, to 'moral timidity,' the 'spirit' appropriate to the Christian life is the 'spirit of power.' But the Apostle has something to say about the nature of this power. When we speak of a person as powerful, if we are not alluding to the fact that he is well-built and physically strong, we generally mean that he is capable of imposing his will on others. A powerful man, in that sense, is not necessarily a good man. The power which ought to inspire the character and conduct of a Christian is a power springing out of love, and seeking the ends of love.

Another type of person who has an air of strength about him is the man who has evidently succeeded, after a long course of practice, in reducing his appetites to a state of entire subjection. Assured of his immunity from the ordinary temptations that assail human beings, he feels justified in regarding his weaker brethren with disdain. But, impressive though that self-complacent and contemptuous attitude sometimes is, the consciousness of superiority on which it is based, and the assumption of a self-righteousness by which it is characterized, are utterly unlike the inward source and governing principle of the power exerted by the Christian. For in his case it is the love of God and of righteous-

ness that invests him with strength; and it is a passionate desire for the true well-being of his fellows that urges him to brave misunderstanding in seeking their good.

Least there should be any danger of this spirit of consideration for others becoming a vapid emotion, the Apostle condenses it, as it were, into a more indissoluble form. The term in the original, 'a sound mind,' really means 'correction,' or 'discipline.' The idea is the same as that which is implied in the words which our Lord addressed to His disciples, 'Ye are the salt of the earth.' In the name of love Christian men and women are to take up arms against unrighteousness. Love is not to seal their lips, but to open them. As sores react painfully to the cleansing and curative virtues of salt, so the influence of Christian men and women ought to be asserted lovingly but still potently. It is possible to concede, and to concede in the interests of good comradeship, till the very distinctions, in vindication of which Christ died, have been betrayed. The pass may be sold by a false geniality and a spurious charity of temper. Let us have courage to affirm that if certain views of life are accepted as authoritative, then the gospel of Jesus Christ is sheer and intolerable twaddle. There are serious questions of intellectual and ethical significance from which we have no right to run away. They have to be investigated with patience, and answered with arguments. But on such great matters as goodness and God and human destiny, do we acknowledge the authority of clever conversationalists and brilliant writers, or the authority of Jesus Christ, the Son of God? ¹

Whoso hath felt the Spirit of the Highest

Cannot confound nor doubt Him nor deny:

Yea with one voice, oh world, tho' thou deniest,
Stand thou on that side, for on this am I.

AN ARMISTICE DAY SERMON.

The Way of Reconciliation.

BY THE REVEREND THOMAS YATES, D.D., LONDON.

'And Laban said to Jacob, Look at this cairn, look at the pillar I have set up between myself and you. This cairn be witness, this pillar be witness, that I will not pass it to attack you, and you shall not pass this cairn and pillar to attack me. The God of Abraham and the God of Nahor judge between us!'—Gn 31⁶¹ (Moffatt).

So concluded a peace conference after an early armistice day. Here is a Scripture story which

¹ A. B. Macaulay, *The Word of the Cross*, 268.

will bear translation into wider terms. It is a squalid story of the antagonisms of two men with their families, sustained for long years, sometimes under a semblance of friendliness, but with the poison always working. They lived together for twenty years with difficulty, and then they broke with each other in vicious quarrel. Long afterwards they came together again, and it was a painful climb over the ugly débris which their animosities had heaped up. They swore amendment, and an end of strife between them. But it took all the determination they had, and every bit of religion in them to make, and still more to keep, that peace compact.

Their antipathies were deeply rooted. Something in blood and temperament set them across each other. At the best of times a vague dislike and suspicion simmered in them. There is no way to peace under such incompatibilities, unless they can together find something bigger than themselves and their own interests which they are mutually willing to put in control.

This was what Jacob and Laban ultimately did. They had drifted into secret deceptions. They went on in attempts to overreach each other. Their relationships were poisoned by insincerities. So life went on, one collision following another, until they both met God, and they knew that the great thing had happened which must now rule them both.

1. Across this story out of old time is written large what men's private strifes come to. These two men suffered from each other, and the wrong spread and involved others. Laban was tricked by Jacob. Jacob was caught by the duplicities of Laban. Neither played the game, or it was the wrong game. And a wrong thing never stops at being a personal and private wrong. You can tell where evil begins, but you can never tell where it will end. It is a surprising traveller. It spreads out over life. So it was with the jealousies and crookednesses of Jacob and Laban. Neither was open and straight. There are chapters which tell of mean bickering about wages, contracts, cattle, profit and loss, and these two went at all this until neither could sleep at night for wondering what the other was up to. There is only one end to this. They broke in bitterness, and parted. Jacob went off by the light of the moon, and took with him what he should have left behind. There was snarling over petty purloining, and the women were mixed up in it. The two families and their followers were involved, and the bad business became worse, until Laban went out in anger

looking for Jacob, and it looked like fighting. It is a poor story.

But see what a spreading thing a wrong and insincere relationship is, and how one crooked thing leads to the next, and how in the issue there is going to be conflict and violence. This is a plain and simple thing, and when we are deeply concerned, as we ought to be, about war and peace among the nations, let none of us overlook the nearer matter of being and keeping peace with our neighbours and our own folk. This that I am saying about the spreading power of strife is lit up by the long human experience. What a great reading we have had in the history and conditions which led up to the Great War! An incessant stream of books has poured out, and they have been read widely because all thoughtful people want to know how that cataclysm befell the world. The more we read, the less we felt we knew. Yet some things are clear. It was a world of endless intrigue into which the War crashed, of diplomatic moves countered by other moves, of long-distance scheming, of feints covering a push elsewhere, of balancing alliances and secret bargainings, and all of it in a twilight region in which nothing actually was what it seemed to be. Another thing too is clear, and it is how few people can involve a whole world in disaster. And what people! Then when the slide began no one could stop it. Almost every one who had had to do with it would like to have stopped it. But the hideous crash was on them and us all, and it was to break the heart of millions of people.

For mankind is one in spirit
And an instinct bears along
Round the earth's electric circle,
The swift flash of right and wrong.
Whether conscious or unconscious,
Yet humanity's vast frame.
In its ocean-sundered fibres,
Feels the gush of joy or shame.
In the gain or loss of one race
All the rest have equal blame.

That is what the rivalries and wrongs of nations come to. It has always been so. These Genesis stories write it again and again. There is a quarrel between two brothers, and the blood of Abel is on the ground in some quiet corner of the earth. The very next chapter is the story of the Deluge. Out of the confused history of the beginnings of the Great War, millions of people in many lands have begun, and will continue, to ask some questions. Can we afford to let the whole region of inter-

national relations be left to the play of non-moral and non-Christian principles? Can we afford to let them continue to be conducted on a basis of accepted insincerity, handled by a few in the half-light, and only seen in their tragic meaning and issues when the flame of war lights them up, and it is too late? As never before in history mankind is asking these questions, and they will have to be answered.

2. We left those two men going after each other in the dark. We have seen an international situation exactly like that, and for the same reason that human relationships between nations were poisoned by false values and gross insincerities. These two men met, and there were expostulations on both sides. Neither had much to say for himself in defence. They were tired of a false way of life. Reaction was heavily upon them both. They wanted to end their contrariness, and get on to another way of living together in the same world. But this is never easy to achieve. How could men, who had found each other out so often, make a fresh and durable bond of confidence? There was no real candour. They kept blaming each other. Each of them thinks that the other has mental reservations. So hard it is for men who have been at strife to get a new basis for life. Yet there is nothing else that will do.

The international situation is like this to-day. It is the inevitable outcome of relationships honeycombed by false values. It is idle and dangerous to obscure the fact of a world situation as precarious as history has seen. The political situation is in certain respects worse than before the War. The new frontiers no more satisfy the peoples most affected than did pre-War frontiers, and are the breeding-places of unrest. Dictatorship rules in many States; the countries of Europe are under diverse and antagonistic political systems; ideas of liberty are under a cloud. Economic nationalism, of an uncompromising kind, is the rule everywhere, definitely lowering the level of life, and immensely increasing international tension. Upon the rock of 'No Concession' the Disarmament Conference is battered to impotence.

One achievement alone stands: the League of Nations. It is a frail barrier between a world at peace and international anarchy, a world where there is not a civilized country in which preparation for war is not going forward. That the League exists is a fact which definitely distinguishes the post-War from the pre-War world. It is not a strong League, because the States which comprise it do not themselves strongly support it, though

they speak of it with fair words, and speak many words within it. Yet it stands, and I do not believe it will sink into futility. It represents the greatest venture of faith in the future which collective nations have ever made. The only hope is that civilized mankind will hold fast to the only grain of wisdom that emerged from the ending of the War—the wise resolution to make effective, in the teeth of all antagonisms, the League of Nations. The nations are like Laban and Jacob. They have realized that they cannot go on in the old ways which made catastrophe inevitable. In the League of Nations they registered their recognition that only an act of trust could keep them from disaster. Now they know that peace is not to be made by a gesture, or secured by an institution. It can come only by a spirit.

I return to these men of the old story, and to what they did. They called on God to guard. They built a cairn and set a pillar on the hillside, and they called it Mizpah. We use this old name, but we have softened and sentimentalized it. We use it to express the wish that God will guard us and our friends while we are apart. 'The Lord watch between thee and me.' It is a kindly prayer. But for Jacob and Laban it had a sterner meaning. It was a declaration of the end of strife. It was an open mutual committal in the name of God that they would seek each other's hurt no more. But in the very act of pledging themselves to seek no more to hurt each other, they doubted their own ability to keep the pledge of themselves. 'God watch us,' they said, for we shall need Him and His guarding every day and for ever, as we need Him now.

Somehow we have to get operative religion into this peace-seeking. There are efforts for it which seem to think of everything except God. Nations are protesting that they want peace, and it is true that they want it. Then why, in God's name, are they not getting it, but preparing for war? There is only one answer. They want peace without the only conditions of peace. Our Lord said the one word about this. 'Seek ye first the rule of God and His right way of it, and all these things shall be added unto you.' Peace is a bonus which can come only upon certain conditions. Is there any way at all but through some decent beginning of obedience to the will of God? The will of God is righteousness—'God's right way of it.' The

debate about war is really closed. It cannot be God's right way. It reverses all the natural and moral relations of men. It settles nothing about right and wrong. As a method of settling international disputes it is incompatible with the teaching and spirit of Christ. But there is no ending of it save in 'God's right way.' 'There is no peace, saith my God, to the wicked.'

We are beginning to see that peace is something more than the absence of war. It is not a negative proposition. Its vision is not of the nations of mankind 'sitting about and making daisy chains,' as Mr. H. G. Wells has said. It is a positive proposal. It is a constructive venture. It is a venture which will take man far, and demand from him a courage more persistent and unwavering, and of a far finer kind, than war has ever evoked. That peace is one with the heart of a living faith in a living God. 'Seek God's right way of it, and these things shall be added.' A passionate realization of God in the life of the world establishes the true values. I reiterate the word of Jesus, 'All these things shall be added to you'—reconciliation of races, disarmament of nations, constructive peace—'shall be added to you.' It is the one possible sequence.

'The new order of peace and brotherhood will be born,' writes Lord Snowden at the end of his Autobiography, 'in the hearts of men, and until that birth, Treaties, Covenants, and Pacts will not save the world from war.'

This day we are joining with many nations in remembrance of those who gave their lives in the Great War. Most of us have long thoughts, and private sorrows are made fresh to-day. I do not wish to intrude upon these in public speech. The public thing was said long before Christ was born. 'The whole earth is the tomb of heroic men, and their story is not graven only upon stone over their clay, but abides without visible symbol woven into the stuff of other men's lives.' Thus we to-day salute our own dead, and as we remember them let no man think too highly of himself, or too meanly of mankind. In their remembrance let us commit ourselves to the eager, determined pursuit of peace, adjusting our lives and affairs to the mind and will of the God of peace. For God's will for man is peace, and in His name and under His guard, we must be servants of the new world in which righteousness shall dwell and reign.

Punishment in Ethics and Theology.

I.

BY G. F. BARBOUR, D.PHIL., FINCASTLE, PITLOCHRY.

THE intellectual climate of the period which is now, perhaps, near its end has been unfriendly to the idea of a moral order of the world. Both the main elements in that idea have tended to suffer eclipse, for neither has providence nor reward and punishment been a favourite subject of thought and discussion. The present paper deals with punishment as a factor in the moral order. Not only is the subject important for ethics, but I believe that it has a living interest for theology, and that an honest examination of it would prove a first step towards overcoming the difficulty which religious teachers find in making the thoughts of salvation and atonement clear to themselves and authoritative to others.

What are the penalties which follow wrong-doing, and how can they help towards its conquest? These questions were, it may be, too absorbing to our forebears, but in recent years they have suffered undue neglect. Yet there is much to be said for the procedure of the elder Moberly, whose great book, *Atonement and Personality*, opened with a brief but searching treatment of punishment.

The neglect into which the conception of punishment has fallen is not due to the logical difficulty of finding a clear connexion between the ideas of ill-doing and of pain. It is true that there is no direct passage in thought from one to the other, just as there is no necessary connexion between the ideas of virtue and happiness—which accounts for the fact that Kant felt bound to round off his ethical system by connecting them in a purely external way. But though the association of reward with virtue, and of punishment with selfishness and wrong, cannot be explained by any process of logical analysis, yet it has been close and persistent through most stages of ethical and religious thought. Not easily does the heart of man surrender its instinctive demand that the good should in the end be happy, and the evil feel the heavy consequences of their wrong-doing.

Why, then, should this long association have been broken in recent times, at least as regards the link between wrong-doing and penal suffering, and why should this last idea have fallen into disrepute? One reason is that the tradition of past theologies still survives, with their ghastly pictures of the

eternity of suffering which awaits the impenitent; nor have we wholly forgotten those savage penal codes and that harsh and unchristian use of punishment, physical and mental, in education which lasted far into the nineteenth century. These provoked a reaction, long-continued and, as reactions often are, extreme, in which the whole idea of penal suffering was impatiently dismissed. A further reason follows from this; for the emphasis laid on the brighter, more hopeful side of life has tended to make men overlook the darker. Optimists no less than pessimists unconsciously select the facts on which they build up their world-view; and those in particular who hold that evil is good in the making are not likely to spend much time in elaborating the thought of the penalties which follow it.

But it is certain that this reaction reached its farthest point in the period before the War. Rather, this easy, optimistic view could hardly survive the shocks of the War—though the present popularity of a non-theological humanism might seem to belie this view. But slowly the lessons of the War, and still more of the Peace, are sinking into the conscience of the nations. In the international sphere we are moving towards the fulfilment of the saying: 'When Thy judgments are in the earth, the inhabitants of the world learn righteousness.' In the sphere of individual conduct also, there are signs that a sterner, more stringent, view of wrong-doing may arise.

We were told some three years ago that the kidnapping and death of Colonel Lindbergh's baby, and the helplessness of the police to provide protection or to bring the criminals to account, did as much as the economic stress and suffering of the time to shake American opinion out of that facile optimism and acquiescence in crime which marked the years before 1929. That narrative of unspeakable baseness stands along with scores of other newspaper reports, and reports to the League of Nations, throwing light on the activities of the kidnapper, the procureur, the drug-trader, and the agent of armament firms who stirs up hatred in the columns of 'controlled' newspapers, or spends large sums in forcing grit into the wheels of successive Disarmament Conferences; and such reports

must make every thoughtful man ask anew, What is the end of these things? Can we contemplate such instances of human degradation and selfishness, untempered and unashamed, without passing from the idea of crime to that of punishment? Is this a morally tolerable world if in it such men can get away with the profits won by a reckless and deliberate disregard of every right and interest of their fellows? When such questions, unwelcome it may be, are forcing their way into all but incurably shallow minds, a re-examination of the problem of punishment would seem to be timely in itself, even apart from its value as a propædæutic to other and more central Christian doctrines.

There is a familiar distinction between the possible views of punishment as deterrent, retributory, and reformatory; and it is also possible to trace the development of the idea in an evolutionary rather than an analytic way by observing how it gradually passes from an external to an internal form. I propose to follow both lines of thought, but to take the latter first.

In its simplest form the penalty of wrong action is looked on as coming entirely from without, inflicted by the forces of Nature or by the social disapproval of fellow-members of the tribe or group. At first penalties of the former type are looked on as the work of deities or spirits which direct the course of Nature. But when animism passes into a more scientific and impersonal form of belief, it gradually comes to be recognized that only in metaphor can we speak of Nature as "punishing" the breach of her laws.¹ Yet the importance of paying heed to the effects of action in the material world does not grow less as we move farther away from primitive conceptions. In the case of civilized as of primitive man it is a great part of the art of life to adapt his action to the ways of Nature; and grave are the penalties if he fails. The modern airman or navigator must observe the signs of the sky not less carefully than the fisherman who follows his calling with sail and oar; indeed, a higher degree of skill and attention is needful for the former, since he has a far wider range of circumstances to consider, and the interests imperilled by his failure are far greater.

At all stages in man's long career he has suffered when he failed to 'obey Nature.' But, even if we hold that this is an essential part of life's discipline in a world ordered by the Divine Mind and Will, yet the penalties which follow wrong (*i.e.* ill-adapted) action in the outer world have one great limitation. It has often been pointed out that Nature 'punishes' ignorance as severely as

deliberate wrong-doing—some would say, much more severely—just as Nature, like the State at a later stage, commonly rewards ability or prowess rather than pure virtue.¹ Even at the present day it is probably true that more suffering is caused by ignorance of the laws of health than by deliberate self-indulgence or neglect of the needs of others. It is imperfect knowledge rather than carelessness which causes men to plant towns and villages on sites infested by malaria, or on the line of geological faults in a region specially subject to earthquake.

Thus, while we believe that no part of the universe in which we live is isolated from the rest, and that we cannot treat the material world as falling outside the scope of God's action,² it remains true that the view of sin and its punishment which Nature affords is at best partial and clouded. In this sphere we learn the importance of studying Nature's ways, and of a constant and careful use of the knowledge gained, both for our own sake and the sake of others. We learn also something of human solidarity by observing how one man's error or carelessness often brings suffering and loss on many. But, valuable as these lessons are, they are too general and impersonal to give us an insight into the true nature of punishment, nor can they make an unambiguous appeal to the *conscience* of man.

It is when we come to punishment as a social practice, exercised in theory at least for the protection of the social group, that true Nature appears. The interest to be safeguarded is one which all members of the group can understand, and it is not impossible that the man who suffers the penalty of his fault at one time may at another be himself a dispenser of justice. However harsh primitive law may be in some of its workings, its general tenour is in line with the sense of the community. Thus the individual begins to sit in judgment on himself. If he is judged by his peers or by a chief of recognized authority, the judgment thus given awakens an answering judgment in his own breast. There is an increasing chance that he may acknowledge its justice; and as soon as he begins to do so the punishment ceases to appear as a pain irrationally imposed from without. He feels that it is something brought on himself by an action in which he preferred his own passing, apparent

¹ On the latter point, cf. A. C. Ewing, *The Morality of Punishment*, 154 f.

² Cf. an article by the present writer, 'Can the Idea of Providence be Maintained?' in *Contemporary Review*, January 1932, 76 f.

good to the real and lasting good of the community.

Thus we pass towards the third and completely inward stage, in which the real penalty is not that which a judge, however high his authority, may impose, but that which is worked out in the conscience and life of the now repentant wrong-doer. If the first stage represented something less than true punishment—the penalty for disregard of natural law being of too impersonal a kind—the third represents something more. In it punishment has become the effort after self-reformation of a fully awakened and self-judging moral being. In Moberly's phrase, 'penal suffering comes ever increasingly to mean the suffering of penance rather than of penalty.'¹

The greatest discussion known to me of this higher, more inward form of punishment—perhaps the most arresting treatment of punishment in all philosophical literature—is that in the *Gorgias* of Plato, especially in the central part of the dialogue, where Socrates is arguing with the young Polus, the ardent follower of the famous sophist, Gorgias. The main contention of Socrates is that it is a worse thing to do than to suffer injustice. 'In my opinion, Polus,' he says, 'the unjust or doer of unjust actions is miserable in any case—more miserable, however, if he be not punished and does not meet with retribution, and less miserable if he be punished and meets with retribution at the hands of God and men.' Polus expresses astonishment at this doctrine, and asks if a man detected in an unjust attempt to make himself a tyrant and put to death after suffering every kind of torture, physical and mental, will be happier than if he escape and become a tyrant. To meet this objection Socrates develops the analogy of health in the soul and body, and argues that virtue is the health of the soul, as sin is its disease. After pointing out that in mind, body, and estate there are three corresponding evils—injustice, disease, poverty—he asks, 'Which of the evils is the most disgraceful? Is not the most disgraceful of them injustice, and in general the evil of the soul?' But if this be the worst of evils, and the way of escape from it be the acceptance of punishment and the enduring of remedial pain, must not the last be a good to be sought out rather than an evil to be shunned. So we reach the paradox with which this part of the argument ends. 'He, then, has the first place in the scale of happiness who has never had vice in his soul. . . . And he has the second place who is delivered from vice, that is to say, he who receives

admonition and rebuke and punishment.' And conversely, 'to do wrong is second only in the scale of evils; but to do wrong and not to be punished is first and greatest of all. . . . Every man ought in every way to guard himself against doing wrong, for he will thereby suffer great evil. And if he, or any one about whom he cares, does wrong, he ought of his own accord to go where he will be immediately punished; he will run to the judge, as he would to the physician, in order that the disease of injustice may not be rendered chronic and become the incurable cancer of the soul.'

Then the further paradoxical conclusion is drawn that the worst fate one can wish for an enemy is that he should escape punishment after he has sinned—'If he has stolen a sum of money, let him keep and spend what he has stolen on him and his, regardless of religion and justice; and if he have done things worthy of death, let him not die, but rather be immortal in his wickedness; or, if this is not possible, let him at any rate be allowed to live as long as he can.'²

Once again before the conclusion of the dialogue Socrates returns to the same thought when arguing with Callicles, a more unflinching exponent than Polus of the doctrine that self-gratification and self-interest are the rule of life—'I affirm that he who desires to be happy must pursue and practise temperance, and run away from intemperance as fast as his legs will carry him: he had better order his life so as not to need punishment; but if either he or any of his friends, whether private individual or city, are in need of punishment, then justice must be done and he must suffer punishment, if he would be happy.'³

In this long discussion, which I have partly quoted, partly summarized, several features stand out clearly. The main thought is that of punishment as a means of reform, and of the efficacy of pain to this end. *How* pain can work the change from love of evil to hatred of it, Plato does not clearly state; but the suffering to which he attributes this effect is recognized as justly incurred (cf. 'justice must be done' in the last sentence quoted), and it must therefore be borne willingly, not in a spirit of revolt. From that follows the sense of urgency which appears again and again—the wrong-doer 'will run to the judge' to heal the hurt of his soul. It is the same urgency which appears in the second canto of Dante's *Purgatorio*, when the spirits found lingering at the base of the

² *Gorg.*, tr. Jowett, 472 f., 477-481a.

³ *Ibid.* 507.

¹ *Atonement and Personality*, 24.

Mountain of Purification are reproved in these words :

What negligence detains you loit'ring here ?
Run to the mountain to cast off those scales,
That from your eyes the sight of God conceal.¹

There is also implicit in Plato's thought the conception, so clearly expressed in modern times by Hegel, that the punishment is not disconnected from, or arbitrarily attached to, the evil done. It is not 'a menace,' which 'may incite a man to rebellion in order that he may demonstrate his freedom. . . . The injury [penalty] is a right of the criminal himself, and is implied in his realized will or act. . . . The Eumenides sleep, but crime wakes them. So it is the criminal's own deed which judges itself.'² Finally Hegel's paradox—itself a re-affirmation of Plato's—that the evil-doer has a *right* to be punished, is taken up and extended by the great Russian moralist, Solovyof : 'The true conception of punishment is many-sided, but each aspect is equally conditioned by the universal moral principle of pity, which includes both the injured and the injurer. The victim of a crime

¹ *Purg.* ii. 115 (tr. Cary).

² *Philosophy of Right*, §§ 99–101 (tr. Dyde, 96 ff.).

has a *right* to protection and, as far as possible, to compensation ; society *has a right* to safety ; the criminal *has a right* to correction and reformation.'³

At the end of this process of development we have reached an idea of punishment which resembles the so-called punishment for the breach of Nature's laws in the inevitability with which it follows the doing of wrong, but which differs *toto cælo* in that its inevitability now has an inward character. It is an inward compulsion which brings the wrong-doer to say, *Mea culpa*, and to seek both to make amends to others and to amend his own life. If the punishment includes deprivation of freedom, that, as Solovyof further says, 'is especially important as a *pause* in the development of the evil will, as an opportunity to bethink himself and repent.'⁴ His eyes may thus be opened to the ugliness and baseness of what formerly attracted him, 'until his iniquity be found to be hateful'—a phrase which in Ps 36 may be a mistranslation, but which expresses one of the most profound truths of moral experience.

(To be concluded.)

³ *The Justification of the Good* (tr. N. A. Duddington), 322 f.

⁴ *Ib.*

Christianity and Progress.

BY THE REVEREND FREDERIC C. SPURR, BIRMINGHAM.

THE idols that men worship are for ever doomed to fall. Dagon is found lying on his face in the early morning and his 'hands cut off upon the threshold.' The golden calf is burned, ground to powder, and strewn upon the water which the people drink. The idols of the mind share a similar fate, but in another realm. Their destruction is none the less real although it lacks a material form.

The great mental idol of the Victorian epoch was named Progress. It was invested with the attributes of Deity itself. Mr. Herbert Spencer declared social progress to be a 'cosmic law identical with biological evolution.' It was inevitable. His camp follower, Mr. H. G. Wells, repeats the dictum of his master. 'Progress,' he says, 'continues in spite of every human fear and folly. Men are borne along through space and time, *regardless of themselves*, as if to the awakening of the greatness

of man.'¹ The italicized words are identical in meaning with Mr. Spencer's 'cosmic law.' Mr. Wells, who is an accredited prophet with some, is so certain of human progress being perfected, that he permits himself to draw in advance, and with much imaginative detail, the world as it will be one day. But the date, unfortunately, runs into six figures. Meanwhile life has to be lived, and it is pressing. The Victorian optimism, however, did not remain unchallenged even in Spencer's time. Ernst Haeckel, who was very confident about the past, and who very cleverly filled up unpleasant gaps with material of his own, was not so sure about the future. In his *Riddle* he had to admit with regret, that there was another and a serious side to his picture. 'We have made little or no progress in moral and social life, in comparison with

¹ *The Work, Wealth, and Happiness of Man.*

early centuries. At times there have been serious reactions.' Professor Huxley went much farther. So far from progress being a 'cosmic law,' and the bearing of men onward 'regardless of themselves,' he insisted that 'social progress means the *checking* of the cosmic progress at every step.' This is in violent opposition to the theory of 'inevitable' progress. It is a small advance towards the Christian idea of progress, although it lacks the specific Christian core.

In our own time the whole idea of human progress is boldly challenged. Spengler has hit it hard in his *Decline of the West*. Dean Inge, as is well known, continually inveighs against it. And Bertrand Russell has evolved a Philosophy which leaves no room at all for any notion of real human progress. 'Man,' he tells us, 'is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving. His origin, problems, hopes and fears, lores and beliefs are but the accidental collocation of atoms. No fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling can preserve an individual life beyond the grave. The whole temple of man's achievement must *inevitably* be buried beneath the débris of a universe in ruins. These things, *if not quite beyond dispute*, are yet so nearly certain that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. . . . Only on the *firm foundation of unyielding despair* can the soul's habitation be safely built. . . . Man, condemned to-day to lose his dearest, is to-morrow himself to pass through the gates of darkness. It remains only to cherish, ere yet the blow falls, the lofty thoughts that ennoble his little day.'¹ And this in a book on 'A free man's worship'!!

The 'free man' who is not awed by a great reputation, would probably like to invite Mr. Bertrand Russell into the witness-box and subject him to a rigorous cross-examination. He might then ask some very awkward questions such as, 'How do you *know* all this?' 'What *science* has given you the right to assume the pontifical robe, and to speak with such assurance?' 'And will you be good enough to inform us in what way can lofty and ennobling thoughts be safely built upon the firm foundation of unyielding despair?' Further, will you kindly tell us how unyielding despair can be a foundation for anything? If you think it can, we shall be obliged if you will offer us a few concrete examples of so prodigious a miracle. You will not think it impertinent if we demand something more substantial than your bare word for your revolutionary ideas.'

¹ *A Free Man's Worship*.

A similar line of cross-examination might, with advantage to clear thinking, be directed to certain eminent men of science, who assure us that the universe is running down, either into ice or fire, they are not sure which. In any case they give us little hope of the final end of humanity which, according to them, is part of this material universe and no more than that. Therefore it shares its fate. True, the catastrophe is millions of years away. But, near or distant, it is inevitable.

Evidently there is something wrong somewhere. Either the *data* is wrong, or the conclusions drawn from them are wrong. But are they really *sure* of their data?

The challenge to the idea of progress comes also from another side—the *historic*. Dean Inge will have it that the notion of progress is entirely modern, that it came in with modern science, that it is nothing more than a magical formula attached to the general idea of evolution, that it has become a fetish, that until modern times men thought in static and not in progressive terms. The world was regarded as fixed. Religion was something fixed, theology was fixed. The future life was conceived as a fixed state on both sides, heaven and hell. Even human society was fixed by Providence.

The rich man in his castle,
The poor man at his gate . . .
The Lord God made them all.

All this may be perfectly true, so far as it goes. But it does not go far enough. It is a very partial reading of history which can arrive at the opinion that the idea of progress is only of recent date.

St. Augustine's *City of God* certainly does not lend colour to the suggestion, and St. Augustine can scarcely be called 'modern.' Nor can St. Thomas Aquinas be left out of the reckoning.

There must be other reasons, then, for combating the idea of progress. And most of them, upon examination, will be found to be the result of the terrible experiences of the Great War.

It is not true to say that the Great War destroyed the theory of progress. What it did was to bring to ruin the foolish and ill-founded optimism which was based upon the material progress of the world due to the new power which science had placed within our hands. It tore the mask from the face of our false gods and revealed their essential cruelty. It disturbed our foolish dreams, and it made it clear for ever that when mankind turns away from the river of the water of life, it is forced to the alternative of preparing a bath of blood.

Despite the horrors of the War, men still have failed to learn its main lesson. It is folly, however, to deny the idea of progress because of the explosion of 1914-1918. . . .

Let us look a little more closely at this question of material progress. It is only by comparison that we can appreciate the enormous difference between the life of, say, one hundred years ago and that of to-day. Then, life was desperately hard, and even cruel, for the workers. The factories had a fourteen-hour day for six days a week. There were a million paupers living in conditions made known to us in the pages of Dickens. The mass of the people were denied what is a necessity—pure milk. Seventy per cent. of the people were illiterate. Drunkenness was common. Sanitation was in an appalling state. The Public Health Act was not passed until the year 1858. When Spurgeon came to London cholera was raging. Tea cost 8s. 6d. a pound, and sugar one shilling. Brutal prize fights were often held. The son of Lord Shaftesbury fought with bare fists sixty rounds at Eton, and after being primed with brandy, was in the end killed. There is little to be proud of in those bad old days. The change for the better has been enormous socially. It is hardly the same world. Materially, the change has been still greater. The coming of electricity, radio, the cinema, the automobile, rapid transport, better houses, and popular education have given us a new material world. Beyond that, science has conquered the soil and the air, and compelled the earth to yield enough food for all men.

But what has all this done for *man as man*? Scientists such as Sir Alfred Ewing, Sir John Russell, Sir William Bragg, and even Julian Huxley tell us candidly that the benefits of science have been wrongly handled, that man's spiritual control has not kept pace with his material control, hence the menace of unemployment, the spectre of poverty amidst incredible wealth, half-starved bodies (whilst grain is burned for want of markets), a growing fear of new and deadlier wars, men mechanized so that they watch a machine do the work they fain would do, an industrial system denuded of humanitarian feeling, the growth of dictatorships, a lessened value of human life, and an abnormally high suicide rate. There is a debit and a credit account of Progress, and at present one seems particularly heavy from the human point of view. To speak of Progress is to offer an insult to millions who ask, bitterly, in what it consists. Progress, as an *idol*, lies with Dagon, its face on the ground. . . .

We must begin again to do some serious thinking and to inquire in what Progress really consists. We cannot accept the world as it is as an evidence of the inevitability of human advance, for if the doctrine of the divine right of kings has gone; that of the divine right of the people to live fully has not replaced it—at least in practice. Roman and Greek slavery have disappeared for ever, as also serfdom and the villain, but slumdom curses our life. Many Roman slaves were infinitely better housed and clad and fed than are millions of dwellers in our modern cities. The barbarities of ancient warfare have only changed their form. Modern fighting is in essence quite as murderous as the ancient massacres, whilst on scale it is infinitely more so. So far as moral and intellectual progress is concerned, it may be pertinent to ask whether we to-day are in advance of Greek sculpture, or Italian painting, or Greek philosophy, or the French architecture of the twelfth century, or the honesty of the medieval market-place. Quite a lot of thinking is necessary before we can continue to chant the praises of progress as explained by Mr. Wells and his school of optimists.

WHAT IS PROGRESS? Fewer than we might suppose have taken the trouble to obtain a definition of what they mean by it. And definition is essential to understanding. Progress, as every schoolboy knows, is the English form of the Latin *progressus* = *progređs*: a march in advance step by step. And it supposes a point of departure and a point of arrival. It is a free march along a definite road to a destined end. Strictly speaking, it is confined to man. We cannot speak of animals, or trees 'progressing.' By breeding or by natural unfolding they develop. But for them there is no *free* march to a destined end. They are under law over which these have no control. With man it is wholly different. He also is under law, but in no fatalistic sense. He works under a Divine charter—'multiply and *subdue* the earth.' 'Thou hast given him *dominion* over the works of thy hands.' The material world is given to him to master. The Christian truth about man is summed up in a sentence; the world is submitted to him, but he is to be submitted to God. He is to master the world in virtue of the fact that he is a Son of God. The world is not his, but God's, and he must treat it as such. He is neither the slave of the material world nor its absolute lord. He is a son and a steward, *and no more*. Now it is precisely this fundamental truth that men refuse to face, hence their advances in material domination, divorced from their true end, and becoming

an end in themselves, arrest progress, and create periodical crises which force the race backwards and plunge it into misery.

Movement, more movement, and ever more speedy movement: it is this which has been mistaken for progress. Men have not paused to ask what they are, why they are here, and where they are going? So long as they are in motion, that is deemed to be sufficient. They have asked few or no questions about themselves: the kind of men they are, the kind of men they are becoming. Or they have been content with cheap and superficial answers supplied by philosophers who have explained man in terms of neuroses, or fatally inherited instincts, or environment, and have missed the greatest things about him. So, after a generation of ever accelerated movement on the one hand, and of materialistic thinking on the other, the world has arrived at a crisis in which it is confused, fearful, disillusioned, incoherent. It is not without significance that in our time human values are cheaply held, and human life for many is wholly without meaning. Mr. Joad, who is not religiously on the side of the angels, is constrained to say 'a generation is arising which has no religion, and no need for one. Also, it is very unhappy, and the suicide rate is abnormally high.' On the Continent of Europe, in the United States, and in Britain, suicides are becoming increasingly common. Youths, students, girls, comedians, and financiers resort to the gas oven and leave behind letters of farewell announcing that they are 'fed up' with things. More than twenty-five financiers of world reputation have terminated their lives within the last four years. . . . PROGRESS!

It ought to be clear what is the radical trouble with the world. To the average person it savours of cant and platitude to say that we have left God out of our calculations. But, however it sounds, it is the simple truth. To refer our miseries to causes financial or industrial or political or commercial, is merely playing with the surface of things. These are only nearer causes, they are not the *radical* cause. The radical cause is far deeper. There are no such entities as finance, industry, politics, or commerce functioning by themselves. These things are the creation of man, and it is his character as creator that is really in question.

Evidently he has created badly, because he has conceived badly, and he has conceived badly because he is related badly. He has forgotten that he is a creature, a steward, a son. He has acted as if he were the proprietor of the planet, and to gain his own ends he has often copied the swift methods of the jungle. He has admitted no authority higher than his own. And he has wholly forgotten the universe and its claim upon him. He has failed to make the progress which God intended for him. He has taken his own way, which has landed him in an *impasse*. He has ignored the 'end' for which he was created.

When we have said everything, we must return to this simple and fundamental fact. If progress is a free march along a definite road to a destined end, man must 'stand in the ways' and ask for the one way which leads to that goal. We must know what that goal is. And it is here that the great opportunity for the Church lies. But first of all the Christian society must know exactly where *it* stands and what *it* believes. It must make up its mind whether or not the 'way' of Christ is the only way of true progress, and then at all costs tread that way, leaving out of the count any question of success or failure. The world will never be changed by being preached to. It must be shepherded, *led*. The disciples of Christ are sufficiently numerous to lead the world if they will consent to live above it and by a higher rule than that which it acknowledges. 'The saints shall *manage* the world' is Moffatt's rendering of St. Paul's famous sentence. We may leave Mr. Bertrand Russell to enjoy his pessimism as best he may, and Mr. Wells to watch the bursting of his coloured bubble. For the Christian there can be neither a depressing pessimism nor a foolish optimism. He lives by faith and the power of God. But that faith must rise to daring adventure and risk, then will the power be available, and not until then.

The Victorian idol of necessary evolutionary progress, regardless of what man does or can do, has been broken by hard circumstances. The niche cannot remain empty. It must be filled with the figure of the Christian idea of progress which places God at the beginning and at the end and as the living director of the marchers.

Recent Foreign Theology.

Essays and Studies.¹

Of the fifteen essays in this volume, ten are reprinted from magazines, but as the magazines are not likely to reach English readers, the publication of them brings Professor Bultmann's opinions within a wider circle of readers than originally they held. Several are upon the Barthian theology. Indeed, one is a full account of Barth's study of First Corinthians as an Epistle dominated by the idea of the resurrection of the dead; while he agrees in the main with Barth's standpoint, he takes exception to several points in the exegesis of the fifteenth chapter. Indeed, this is Bultmann's usual position in these essays. He sympathizes with some of the leading tenets of Barth, but his sympathy is critical and independent. The various papers touch such topics as 'The Significance of the Historical Jesus for Paul's Theology' (p. 188 f.), 'Miracle' (p. 214 f.), 'The Christian Command to love One's Neighbour' (p. 229 f.), 'The Christology of the New Testament' (p. 245 f.), 'The Conception of "The Word of God" in the New Testament' (p. 268 f.), and 'The Significance of the Old Testament for Christian Faith' (p. 313 f.), besides a paper on 'The Eschatology of John's Gospel' (p. 134 f.). In a collection of reviews and studies like this there is inevitably some repetition, but the reader certainly gets Bultmann's position put before him lucidly and sharply. The unity underlying the various papers is the unity of a definite outlook upon theology and the Bible, which is neither for nor against the Dialectic Theology, though it might be described as more in favour of it than opposed to it. It is impossible within the limits of a short review to discuss the views put forward on so many aspects of the subject. But, as there is no index to the volume, I shall note, for the benefit of readers, some details of importance to which students will desire to refer.

The Person of Christ (pp. 9 f., 67 f., 93 f., 250 f.); What is the Modern 'stumblingblock' in Christianity? (pp. 8, 15 f.); Faith (pp. 22 f., 35 f., 70 f., 87 f., 101 f., 143 f., in John's terminology, 298 f.); Paul's Hymn of Love (p. 49 f.); Love to One's Neighbour (pp. 80 f., 195 f.); Theology (pp. 89 f., 167 f., of Paul, 308 f.); The Word of God (pp. 106 f., 122 f., 181 f., 273 f., 325 f.); The term *σῶμα* in the N.T. (p. 129 f.); 'Abiding' as a Johannine term

(p. 149 f.); The Church in the N.T. (pp. 162 f., 257 f., 332 f.); History and Revelation (pp. 287 f., 323 f.).

One of the remarkable features of the book is that it breaks away from the theological presuppositions of the 'Liberal' theology and yet employs its literary methods. Professor Bultmann writes, as all his readers know, with a true gusto. He is sworn to no school, but in his independence he contrives to avoid being eccentric. It is good to have this collection of his papers, if only to receive the impact of a keen, original mind, which is really interested in religion as well as equipped for the discussion of its philosophy and records.

Brunner and Barth.²

CONTROVERSY is an excellent thing in Christianity. That is, if it is conducted in a Christian spirit, and if it is stirred by some fundamental issue. Granted these two conditions, controversy may be educative. They are both present in Professor Brunner's pamphlet; it is a dignified, courteous piece of writing, which penetrates to the fundamental issue at stake. It is well known that Barth has repudiated his former colleague and ally as an exponent of the true Reformation-theology, on the ground that Brunner allows for a certain 'natural theology.' Without abating his admiration and gratitude for Barth's services, Brunner sets himself to prove that Barth has interpreted both Luther and Calvin too rigidly, that the antitheses of his Dialectic are untrue to the Reformed Church, and in particular that even sinful man has not entirely lost the 'likeness of God,' since the very challenge and appeal of revelation assumes that he is mentally rational and morally responsible.

The weight of the argument lies in Brunner's lucid exposition of the witness to God which is implicit in the human conscience (p. 12 f.) and in the general 'humanitas' of our race. He brings out Calvin's recognition of the revelation in Nature and in Scripture (p. 22 f.), as well as Luther's (p. 31 f.), in order to explode Barth's charge of an 'approximation to Catholicism' in any such estimate of man and the world. He concludes his pamphlet by declaring that 'the task of our theological generation is to

¹ Rudolf Bultmann, *Glauben und Verstehen* (Mohr, Tübingen; M.12.6c).

² *Natur und Gnade: zum Gespräch mit Karl Barth*, von D.D.D. Emil Brunner (Mohr, Tübingen; M.1.50).

recover the true "theologia naturalis," and few who are alive to the ethical problems of Christianity will deny that he has diagnosed the situation adequately. There is a false 'theologia naturalis,' against which it was high time that a genius like Barth should protest. But, as Brunner has little difficulty in showing, the protest is one-sided.

To those who are familiar with Brunner's recent writings, especially his *Gebot*, this pamphlet has little or nothing that is novel. What makes it impressive is the admirable tone of the argument as well as the closely knit account of a genuine 'natural theology' at the heart of vital Christianity.

Lietzmann's Commentary upon the Epistle to the Romans.¹

IN five years another edition of this compact and suggestive commentary has been required—a tribute to its hold upon the public. It contains Lietzmann's introduction to the textual criticism of the Pauline Epistles, of course—which invests the little book with particular value; but it is the terse scholarship of the exposition which is responsible for its vogue in Germany. The only English edition known to Lietzmann seems to be Sanday and Headlam's, and the one French edition mentioned is that by Lagrange, which he pronounces to be written 'with care and good judgment.' It is interesting to note some of the editor's conclusions upon disputed points. He is not in favour of assigning the sixteenth chapter to a special note addressed to Ephesus. He thinks that the opening sentences of 9 suggest that in 9-11 the Apostle is meeting the charge that he was a radical apostate from his old religion and its sacred traditions, a charge which had been circulated among the Roman Christians. On 16² he notes that the Greek term cannot mean 'a patroness' in the technical sense, since a woman had no legal standing in court; besides, Paul as a Roman citizen required no 'patron' at all. The word denotes 'succourer' or 'help,' in a general sense. On 7⁴ he recognizes that 'ye were made dead to the law through the body of Christ' can only be an allusion to the crucified body of Jesus on the Cross (as in 6¹⁰—'the death he died, he died to sin'), not to the mystical Body of the Church. On 9⁵ he inclines to connect the doxology with

¹ Hans Lietzmann, *An die Römer*: [Handbuch zum Neuen Testament, 8], Vierte Auflage (Mohr, Tübingen; M.4.50).

God; the one method of handling the verse which he rules out unhesitatingly is that of textual change, as, for example, reading $\delta\upsilon\upsilon\ \delta\ \epsilon\pi\iota$ for $\delta\ \delta\upsilon\upsilon\ \epsilon\pi\iota$ (as if God were only 'God of the Jews'!). In commenting on 15²⁵, I notice, Lietzmann seems to agree with those who hold that the Jerusalem Church called themselves 'The Saints' in a specific sense, and also 'The Poor' (in the sense of the Anawin or humble saints of the Psalter, the quiet in the land). Surely this interpretation needs to be qualified. I doubt if Paul, even in his most keen desire to promote good fellowship between the two wings of the Church, would have admitted the former claim. And would he have asked money from his Gentile churches simply to allow Jerusalem Christians to enjoy the prestige of living in poverty of an evangelical kind? Not all the Christians at Jerusalem practised the 'communism' of the primitive period, as we know from Acts. That there was poverty in Judæa and at Jerusalem, perhaps poverty of a chronic character, is more than probable, but it was due to various causes. These gave Paul the opportunity of rallying his churches to the support of their starving brothers in Palestine, but there is no historical proof that the latter plumed themselves upon the title of 'The Poor,' as a specially honourable designation.

Some of the special notes are masterpieces of compressed learning, notably those on 'Jesus as Lord' and 'Polemic against paganism.' The brief note on $\lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\kappa\eta\ \lambda\alpha\tau\tau\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha$ (12¹) supports the rendering, 'this is your spiritual service' by adducing evidence that the widespread emphasis upon true sacrifice as $\lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\kappa\eta$ stressed not the predominance of the ethical over the ritual, but the truth that real sacrifice must correspond to the Logos, whatever that might be. 'This idea grew up originally on the soil of the later Stoicism, then it developed in Hellenistic mysticism, and probably reached Paul through some Jewish medium.'

JAMES MOFFATT.

New York.

Varia.

THE quest of the *ipsissima verba* of the Old Testament is an important element in the scientific study of Scripture. While we may be constrained to admit that the aim may never be wholly attained, and that there will always be passages so corrupt as to defy reconstruction, we welcome any contribution which helps us to approach a little nearer to the ideal. The value of the LXX in particular cannot be overestimated, and recent studies, such as those

of Wutz and Kaminka, have enabled us to make valuable progress in the use of this ancient version.

In his work on Isaiah,¹ Dr. Joseph Ziegler has given us a thorough study of one part of the field. After some preliminary discussion of the methods employed in translation, he deals with the vexed question as to whether the whole comes from a single writer or from two different hands. He comes to the conclusion that the basis was a translation of *portions* of the book—perhaps a lectionary—worked over and completed by a later scholar. The result, however, is modestly stated, and it may be remarked that the citations in ch. vii (which deals with the influence of different parts of the translation of Isaiah on one another) suggest that the translator of Is 1-39 was familiar with the Greek version of chs. 40-66, but that the latter was carried out in ignorance of the LXX of the earlier part.

The next aspect of the subject is the question of apparent omissions and additions to the Hebrew text (the 'minus' and 'plus' of the LXX). The influence of other parts of the Greek Old Testament is also considered. But the two most interesting portions of the book are those which deal with the metaphors and similes employed by the LXX, and the Egyptian-Jewish background of the whole. In both chs. (v. and vi.) Dr. Ziegler shows how the Greek translator often substitutes an expression familiar to his immediate public for one which would be obscure or unintelligible to a reader who did not know the conditions of life in Palestine. Here we may remark that the author, though generally alive to the possibility of an alternative Hebrew text underlying the Greek, does not always give it due weight. *E.g.*, in Is 58^b he does not see that the Egyptian text may have had *כְּהוֹן מִפְּרִיזָה* for the MT *כְּהוֹן מִפְּרִיזָה*. But a few details of this kind do not invalidate the soundness of Dr. Ziegler's general position.

To many students the broad results of this study, though justified by the facts adduced, will be disappointing. It is clear that the Greek rendering of Isaiah is so free that it can be used only with great caution in the reconstruction of the underlying Hebrew text. By way of compensation, however, we have valuable light on the conditions of life and thought prevailing in the Jewish community

of Alexandria—a subject on which every item of information is of importance.

Passing from textual to higher criticism, we may recall the fact that, in *THE EXPOSITORY TIMES* for October 1931, the late Professor J. E. McFadyen reviewed a book by Pastor Wilhelm Möller, dealing with modern Pentateuchal criticism. Much of what was said then will apply equally well to Pastor Möller's latest publication, which is a complete Introduction to the Old Testament.² Whilst the author has had, in this volume, the help of a son and of a daughter, both write in the style and spirit of their father, and the work has not suffered loss either of unity or of uniformity. We note the exhaustive knowledge of the literature of the subject which has been manifested in Pastor Möller's earlier work, the same familiarity with the actual text of the Old Testament, the same determination to leave no point untouched, and the same methods of reasoning. It is true that the latter is not always convincing, and may not always be acceptable to readers who would otherwise be in complete sympathy with the author. One instance may suffice. It is notorious that it is difficult to reconcile the chronology of 2 Kings with the references to Israelite kings on the inscriptions of Assyrian kings, especially Shalmaneser III. and Tiglath-pileser III. Pastor Möller (pp. 90 f.) is inclined to doubt whether the kings mentioned in the Assyrian records really are those of Israel, thus depriving of valuable evidence those who would use these monuments to support the historicity of the Bible. We note also a very strong interest in eschatology; the Book of Daniel receives more space than any other—thirty-seven pages, while the whole Pentateuch has but fifty-two. But the author has fully considered all the most recent work, including that of Boufford and Rowley.

It is obviously impossible to discuss such a book here in detail. Pastor Möller seeks in every instance first to meet the views of higher critics, whose views are carefully and fairly stated, and then to give his own position. Under this head stress is laid, among other points, on the structure of the individual books, and considerable use is made of numbers, the symmetry they exhibit, and the symbolism they carry. In much of this we are reminded of the work of Hengstenberg, who, indeed, is often cited. The Old Testament, too, is seen as an organic whole,

² *Einleitung in das Alte Testament*, herausgegeben in Verbindung mit Lic. Grete Möller und Lic. Hans Möller, von Pastor Lic. Wilhelm Möller (Herrmann, Zwickau; 1934, RM. 14.50).

¹ *Untersuchungen zur Septuaginta des Buches Isaías*, von Dr. theol. Joseph Ziegler, Privatdozent an der Universität Würzburg (Alttestamentliche Abhandlungen, herausgegeben von A. Schultze. Band 12, Heft 3). (Aschendorff, Münster; RM. 11.40.)

whose parts are intricately related, and lead up to an eschatological gospel.

The book is significant rather from the viewpoint of dogmatic (we might almost say, polemic) theology than from that of Old Testament studies. 'Jews ask for signs, and Greeks seek after wisdom'—and the two types of mind encountered by the Apostle are with us still. Neither, be it remarked in passing, is ever likely to convince the other by argument, and, as long as the two exist side by side, the best we can hope for is mutual respect and tolerance of one another's opinions. Pastor Möller writes, frankly and professedly, from the standpoint of conservative theology, and the most important part of the book is to be found in the concluding pages, under the heading 'The Bible, including the Old Testament, as the Word of God.' To him, traditional authorship, canonicity, and inspiration are inextricably interwoven, and he feels intensely that, if the critics are right, the Bible cannot possibly be the Word of God (p. 297). He is not blind to the spiritual danger of bibliolatry, but is convinced that the loss of Divine inspiration would be a yet greater peril. It may be that, for not a few of us, it is only a critical position which enables us to believe that the Old Testament is inspired by that God whose full self-revelation came only in the Incarnation and the Cross. But it behoves us, as we do our critical work, to remember that there are others who are at one with Pastor Möller, to whom criticism is almost a blasphemous form of vivisection, and to treat with reverence that which he and they would regard as 'holy ground.'

The general tendency of Old Testament scholarship, however, is to pass beyond philological and critical discussions, and to deal with the thought of Israel, secular and religious. A good illustration is to be seen in the recent work of Grether,¹ dealing with certain aspects of Divine revelation in the Old Testament. The two concepts chosen for discussion are those of the Name ('Shem') and the Word ('Dabar'). The history of each is carefully traced, and the final chapter is devoted to a comparison of the two, leading up to their use in the New Testament. In each case Grether believes that the concept developed into what was practically a 'hypostasis,' though this result was reached only at the end of a long history. It is noteworthy that Deuteronomy is regarded as pivotal in both instances; there are three stages in the evolution—pre-

Deuteronomic, Deuteronomic, and post-Deuteronomic.

The history of the 'Name' idea is clear, straightforward, and comparatively unambiguous; 'static' is one of the terms Grether uses to describe it. The 'Word' idea, on the other hand, is much more elusive. Two main aspects are distinguished, the legal Word (the author accepts the Mosaic origin of the Decalogue) and the prophetic. The two are compared and contrasted, the Word of Yahweh being the motive power behind history, Nature, and Scripture, in fact wherever God is in action, while the Name is the revealed totality of an absolute God. The two find their synthesis in the ultimate doctrine of salvation.

The wide range of meanings which may be given to the term 'Word' (of which Grether is fully conscious) suggests that possibly it should not be treated as a single concept. No doubt all the various significations it assumes can be traced back to a common origin, but, in practice, the Word of Yahweh is simply His self-revelation in a form appreciable by humanity. So the author's full and thorough study suggests rather that it is a comprehensive term which includes other modes of revelation and should not be differentiated from them. In this connexion, we feel a certain weakness in the handling of the 'prophetic Word,' where revelation by 'dabar' is distinguished from other forms—dreams, audition, vision, ecstasy. It is significant that Grether has not offered a clear statement of the psychological aspect of revelation by 'dabar.' In the other modes, we know—or we can conjecturally describe—what actually happened to a prophet, what his inward and outward experiences were. But how did the 'dabar' come to him? The natural inference would be that it came through audition, but this is rejected by Grether, while he offers no alternative psychological process. Of one thing we may be certain; the 'dabar' was not simply a subjective conviction, however strong, as to the will of God. An objective criterion is necessarily demanded both by the speaker and by the hearers, both by the prophet and by his audience. Failure to recognize this essential feature of prophecy is to misunderstand the mind of ancient Israel.

The book is, nevertheless, a fine piece of thorough and conscientious work. It is, apparently, Grether's first serious contribution to Old Testament studies, and we may offer a cordial welcome to one who may, in years to come, add substantially to our knowledge and appreciation of the Hebrew Scriptures.

¹ *Name und Wort Gottes im Alten Testament*, von Lic. Oskar Grether (*Beihefte zur Z.A.W.*, 64). Töpelmann, Giessen; 1934, RM.9.00.

The current number of the *Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*¹ maintains the traditions of that journal. An article by H. W. Wolff deals with certain aspects of the prophetic utterances, particularly the form in which they are couched. The usual oracle consists of (a) a threat (or a promise), and (b) the reason why it is uttered; and the ways in which these elements are combined may be found to have a certain significance. J. Seierstad discusses the experience of Amos, taking a line which, in some ways, reminds the reader of Grether's position. The prophet was aware of the will of God, though he did not attain his knowledge by the means common to the N'bi'im, and for him to know the will of God was to obey it. The veteran Karl Budde discusses the origin of the Zadokite priesthood. He notes that, while Abiathar was the priest who handled the Ephod in David's early years, Zadok appears only with the Ark, and makes the interesting suggestion that he was the brother of that Uzza who perished as the Ark was being brought up to Jerusalem. G. R. Driver contributes some notes on obscure words in the Old Testament, bringing to bear on the subject his encyclopædic knowledge of all the known Semitic languages. F. Dornseiff attempts a new interpretation of certain passages in Genesis in the light of other ancient literatures, and his references to Homer are particularly interesting, since he finds a common influence on both early Greek and early Hebrew thought in Western Asia. His critical views are wholly conservative, but, nevertheless, he draws some interesting parallels. Finally, we have short notes by W. W. Cannon on Is 57¹⁴⁻²¹, by G. Richter on Dt 32¹⁰, and by A. Rahlfs on the war-elephants mentioned in 1 Mac., while Hempel himself adds brief comments on some of the more illuminating of recent publications—including Eissfeldt's great Introduction. In view of its international character and the fact that it is the only journal wholly devoted to the Old Testament, the *Z.A.W.* deserves the consideration and support of all who are interested in scientific Biblical studies.

T. H. ROBINSON.

Cardiff.

The 'German-Faith' Controversy.

THIS paganizing movement in Germany has produced an active opposition from the churches in which the protagonists in the Church dispute make common cause. In the 'Apologetische Centrale'

¹ Bd. xi. Heft 1 (Töpelmann, Giessen).

in the Johannesstift in Berlin-Spandau, a counter-movement is being organized. I have seen notices of two books in defence of the Christian faith—'Die Nation vor Gott: Zur Botschaft der Kirche in Dritten Reich,' essays by different authors, and 'Kreuz und Reich,' by Hans Asmussen. I have just read a third book *Mythos und Offenbarung*, by Karl Witte,² of which I offer a brief account.

The leaders of the 'German-Faith' movement are Hauer, Bergmann, and Count Revenlaw. This book deals with the first and the second, and also with Herman Wirth. The attitude of Hauer to Christianity is tolerant, and all that he claims is that the State should recognize the 'German-Faith' as a religious community, parallel with the Roman Catholic Church and the Protestant churches. Far other is the attitude of Bergmann in his book—'Deutschland, das Bildungsland der neuen Menschheit.' His aim is 'the destruction of Christianity, and the formation of a "German-Faith" religion, which corresponds with the Nordic race' (p. 6). The title indicates the ambition of the author, and his extravagant nationalism. Attention, however, is also given to the work of Herman Wirth—'Der Ausgang der Menschheit.' As 'the year is for the Nordic man the great revelation of the Divine activity in the World,' Wirth's religious consciousness is summed up as 'the myth of the Holy Year' (p. 10), and is in a searching way compared with Christianity as history. The German religion is then subjected to a scathing criticism, and the central issue is faced in the question, Is Christ myth or revelation? 'Easter,' says Witte, 'means not only the rebirth of humanity, but also the restoration of the creation, new heaven and new earth' (p. 44). In discussing the application of this myth to politics, the author recalls the conflict of the Reformers with the fanatical movements, and likens the situation of Germany to-day to the old alternative—'Luther or Thomas Münzer.' To reproduce the convincing argument is here impossible. All that has been attempted is to sketch its course. The book is well worth reading.

Although not a controversial work, the latest publication of Dr. Arthur Titius, *Die Anfänge der Religion bei Ariern und Israeliten*,³ is the more effective as a 'counter-blast' to this German-Faith movement. The exposition of the subject occupies forty-three pages, and the notes forty-one. It displays the amazingly wide learning and the

² Wichern-Verlag, Berlin, 1934; M.1.50.

³ Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1934. M.2.80.

strictly impartial judgment of the author; but he proves by his exposition of the facts, fully attested in the notes, how closely the beginnings of the two religions, now polemically opposed, resemble one another as expressive of the common human consciousness in religion, and how, when there are differences, the Israelitish is an advance on the Aryan. With great minuteness and unflinching accuracy he compares the sociological aspect, the significance

of the cultus, and the mythological elements of these religions, including under the Aryan, Indian, Iranian, and Germanic. His general conclusion is that the different developments from similar beginnings are not due to physiological-psychical differences of race, but to history (p. 43). The value of this book must not be measured by its size.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

London.

Entre Nous.

Sadhu Sundar Singh.

Since the 13th of April 1929, when Sadhu Sundar Singh started on his last journey into Tibet, nothing has been heard of him, and his death has been officially presumed. A personal memoir of him has just been written by Mr. C. F. Andrews (Hodder & Stoughton; 3s. 6d. net)—confined to the early years when Andrews was in close touch with the Sadhu. For a number of years, up to 1911, Principal Rudra and his two sons and Andrews went to Bareri, above Kotgarh, every spring, and there they met the Sadhu, and all communed together on the things they had so deeply at heart. For it was from Kotgarh, as soon as the winter snows had melted, that the Sadhu started year by year on the first stage of his perilous journeys into the mountains of Tibet. The Memoir, though it is informal and from its nature cannot be exhaustive, is written at first hand and by one well fitted to interpret the Sadhu, and we welcome it warmly. There are two special points in it which we might touch on—the literalism of the Sadhu and his own conception of his vocation.

Sadhu Sundar Singh sought to follow literally in the footsteps of the Master. He was often too literal, Mr. Andrews says, but his devotion was so great that he could not go far astray. 'When Jesus said: "Foxes have holes and the birds of the air have nests, but the Son of Man hath not where to lay his head," Sundar Singh took this at once as sanctioning the Sadhu life. When Jesus said: "Take neither purse nor script neither two coats," he obeyed to the very letter.' Much of his teaching was in the form of simple parables, and here, too, his object was to follow Christ literally. They were taken for the most part from what he had seen in the Himalayas, but some were inspired by his visit to Palestine—a visit which stirred his soul to its depths.

"In 1922," he writes, "when travelling in Palestine with a friend, I was greatly refreshed by drinking the sweet and soothing water of a famous well. An hour or two later I was again thirsty, and those words of our Lord came forcibly to my mind: 'Whosoever drinketh of this water shall thirst again; but whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give him shall never thirst, but the water that I shall give him shall be in him a well of water springing up into everlasting life.'

"I had just drunk of a well that men had dug and was again thirsty. In all humility and thankfulness I can say that since I gave my heart to Christ and drank of that water which He gave me, I have never been thirsty, because He is indeed the Fountain of Life."

Another parable points out 'how the Sea of Galilee which takes in the pure fresh water from the snows of Lebanon remains always fresh and sweet with the flowers of the field covering its rising banks, because it always passes on the water it receives. But the Dead Sea, which receives the same water that has flowed through the Sea of Galilee, turns the pure fresh water into salt water so full of brine that on its banks nothing can grow at all. It is a Dead Sea because it takes in but never gives out. So Christians who unselfishly pass on the good gifts which God gives to them remain pure and fresh in their spiritual life, while those who take in God's gifts and never give out unselfishly to others, become dead and lifeless.'

Turning now to vocation. The Sadhu, while his heart went out in sympathy to those who became members of special Orders, felt led himself to an individual and solitary course. 'The life in Christ which he had been called upon to follow, must be on the heights, like a rushing mountain stream.'

"The streams," he said, "in the Himalayan Mountains, as they rush forth from the pure white

snows, cut their own course. Each one has its own appointed path which it follows down the mountain-side. That rushing torrent of pure water from the heights is the true symbol of the Christian life as it comes direct from Christ Himself.

'But when the same waters reach the plains, they carry the mud along with them, and their tributaries are diverted into channels by artificial means, forming irrigation canals. These, too, have their uses, but they depend on the streams which flow from the mountain heights for their perennial supply of fresh and living water.'

'Even so, he would add, there may be the need of organizations formed by men to make the Christian life spread itself far and wide among the masses of mankind; but the pure rushing streams from the mountain heights must never be allowed to run dry.'

Forgiveness.

'The ordinary Divinity students [at the Theological College in Lahore] seemed to feel all the while that the Sadhu was setting up a new standard superior to their own, and that they were being silently condemned by his presence among them.

'Sundar did his utmost to avoid anything that might be regarded as censorious, and remained humbly waiting to win their goodwill and affection; but this did not appear for some time.

'One day, a student, who had been a ringleader in this resentful treatment, saw Sundar apart under a tree, sitting alone, and went up quite close to him without being noticed by him. To his great surprise, he found that Sundar was in tears, pouring out his heart to God in earnest supplication on behalf of this very student who had thus come near. He was praying that anything which he himself might have done amiss might be forgiven, and that true love might be established between them.

'The student, when he heard this prayer, was so overcome, that he discovered himself to Sundar on the spot and asked his forgiveness, and they became close friends.'¹

Guidance.

In *God does Guide Us*, Mr. Sangster makes his purpose and method plain from the beginning. 'The aim of this book,' he says, 'is to explain and defend the "Group" view of guidance.' He does this to a considerable extent through illustrations, and these are drawn 'from beyond the borders of the Movement.'

¹ C. F. Andrews, *Sadhu Sundar Singh*, 92.

Here is one of the illustrations given in full. 'Think of F. W. Robertson, the prophetic preacher of Brighton. He wanted to be a soldier, as his father and grandfather had been, and as his three brothers were. He says: "I was rocked and cradled to the roar of artillery and the very name of such things sounds to me like home. . . . I cannot see a regiment manœuvre, nor artillery in motion, without a choking sensation."

'But the commission, for which he had applied, was long delayed, and finally, though with great reluctance, he took his father's advice, and the advice of a friend, and matriculated at Brazenose as a preparation for taking orders. Five days later the commission came. Robertson's feelings can be imagined, but he accepted his father's judgment that God had directed the circumstances, and the commission was declined. He was long perplexed by it, the part his friend had played and the trivialities on which the decision seemed to turn. Among his papers, this relic of his perplexity was found: "If I had not met a certain person, I should not have changed my profession; if I had not known a certain lady, I should not probably have met this person; if that lady had not had a delicate daughter who was disturbed by the barking of my dog, if my dog had not barked that night, I should now have been in the dragons or fertilising the soil of India. Who can say that these things were not ordered?"'

But does this enable us to say anything more than that in looking back we can see that God had a plan for us. Is it not before the event that we require guidance, and to be satisfying must it not carry some sense of assurance with it? To bring out the certainty of guidance and at the same time the need of discipline, Mr. Sangster quotes from Mrs. Herman's 'Creative Prayer.' 'The alert and courageous soul making its first venture upon the spiritual life is like a wireless operator on his trial trip in the Pacific. At the mercy of a myriad electrical whispers, the novice at the receiver does not know what to think. How fascinating they are, these ghostly pipings and mutterings, delicate scratchings and thin murmurs—and how confusing!

'Now he catches the plaintive mutterings of a P. & O. liner trying to reach a French steamer, now the silvery tinkle from a Japanese gunboat seeking its shore station. There are aimless but curiously insistent noises, like grains of sand tumbling across tar paper: these are the so-called "static" noises of the atmosphere adjusting itself to a state of electrical balance. . . . Now he thinks

he has got his message, but it is only the murmured greetings of ships that pass in the night. And then, just as his ear has begun to get adjusted to the weird babel of crossing sounds, there comes a remote and thrilling whisper that plucks at his taut nerves and makes him forget all his newly-acquired knowledge. It is the singing of the spheres, the electrical turmoil of stars beyond the reach of the telescope, the birth-cry and death-wail of worlds. And when he is steeped soul-deep in the spell of this song of songs, there comes a squeaking, nervous spark, sharp as the squeal of a frightened rat. He decides to ignore it, and then suddenly realizes that it is calling the name of his own boat. It is the expected message, and he nearly missed it!

'So the soul that waits in silence must learn to disentangle the voice of God from the net of other voices—the ghostly whisperings of the subconscious self, the luring voices of the world, the hindering voices of misguided friendship, the clamour of personal ambition and vanity, the murmur of self-will, the song of unbridled imagination, the thrilling note of religious romance.'

What are we to say to those who honestly feel that the possibility cannot be ruled out that all the seeming instances of guidance are after all only the result of coincidence or imagination? Mr. Sangster answers: 'Pure coincidences almost always have an "odd" character. They happen—but it would be difficult to discover even a freakish "purpose" in them, nor does one strange coincidence have any kind of relation to another. But in the company of those who wait on God for guidance one story finds many parallels and, when all the experience has been pooled, one cannot resist the conclusion that a purposeful mind is moving behind it to a definite end. Professor Bernard Bosanquet in *The Essentials of Logic* tells of the doubt he felt in the judgment of his anti-quarian friends when they showed him a few mis-shapen pieces of flint and declared that they were primitive tools. A casual glance at two or three examples gave no justification for the theory. The suggestion seemed fantastic. But when Bosanquet saw the fine collection of flints in the Blackmore Museum—the same features repeated again and again in a hundred different specimens—his doubts disappeared. Clearly they were man-made with a purposeful mind behind them.'

The publishers of *God does Guide Us* are Messrs. Hodder & Stoughton, and the price 3s. 6d. net. It is a closely reasoned and persuasive survey

of a problem that no one can afford to put aside.

No Personal Experience.

'To those who have no experience of this guidance, denial will seem easy. But it is perilous to deny anything on that ground alone. One is reminded of the little girl who thought that she had exhausted mathematics when she had learned the twelve-times table, and when her grandfather said, with a twinkle in his eye, "What's thirteen times thirteen?" she turned on him with undisguised scorn and said, "Don't be silly, Grandpa: there's no such thing."'¹

Moral Control lags behind Science.

'We meet in a year which has to some extent seen science arraigned before the bar of public opinion; there are many who attribute most of our present national woes—including unemployment in industry and the danger of war—to the recent rapid advance in scientific knowledge. . . . We cannot ignore the tragic fact that . . . science has given man control over Nature before he has gained control over himself. . . . This is only one chapter of a long story—human nature changes very slowly, and so for ever lags behind human knowledge, which accumulates very rapidly. The plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles still thrill us with their vital human interest, but the scientific writings of Aristarchus and Ptolemy are dead—mere historical curiosities which leave us cold. Scientific knowledge is transmitted from one generation to another, while acquired characteristics are not. Thus, in respect of knowledge, each generation stands on the shoulders of its predecessor, but in respect of human nature, both stand on the same ground.'²

Goodness with a Plus.

'If Christ came merely to tell men to be good there was nothing new about His message. Men knew that long before. But He did come to bring men Godliness—that is, goodness with a plus. In words that are not unfamiliar in this place where I am speaking, Christianity does not consist in abstaining from doing things that no gentleman would think of doing, but in doing things that are unlikely to occur to any one who is not in touch with the spirit of Christ.'³

¹ W. E. Sangster, *God does Guide Us*, 35.

² Sir James H. Jeans in his presidential address to the British Association, Aberdeen, 5th Sept. 1934.

³ C. H. Ritchie in *St. Martin's Review*.

The Christian Message.

In the records of French Protestant missions occurs the account of his conversion given by a chief of the Mohegan Indians. 'There came to us a preacher who wanted to teach us and who began by proving to us that there was a God. But we said, "Do you think we don't know that? You can go back where you came from." Another time there was a preacher who wanted us to learn that we must not steal or get drunk or tell lies. We said to him, "Fool that you are, do you think we don't know that? Learn it yourself and teach your own people, for who steal and get drunk and lie more than your own brothers?" And we sent him back. Some time after came Christian-Henri who came into my hut and sat down by me. "I come to you," he said, "from the Lord of heaven and earth. He lets you know that He desires to make you happy and to snatch you from the misery in which you are living." And he told the work of Christ and His sufferings. Then he lay down in my hut on a plank and went to sleep, for he was weary after his journey. Now I thought, "What is this man who sleeps there so peacefully? I could kill him, throw him into the forest, and nobody would know; and there he is without anxiety." But I could not forget his words, they came back to me even in my sleep as I dreamt of the blood which Christ had poured out for us. Then I thought, "Here is something new," and I passed on to other Indians the words which Christian-Henri kept on telling us.'¹

The God of Peace.

A Nigerian missionary arrived at a Communion service in which four towns were uniting, and heard an African addressing the crowded church in a preparatory meeting as follows: 'I cannot tell you the gladness that is in my heart to-day. As I walked along the path with the other members from my town, I saw that each man held in his hand his Testament and his hymn-book. No man carried a cutlass or a gun. No man walked with fear, every man with faith in you. And yet it is but four years ago that no man from my town would have walked through your town without a cutlass

in his hand, and even then he would not have walked alone. Nor would any man from your town have come unarmed through ours. What is the reason of this difference? At that time we worshipped the same gods as you did. To-day we worship the same God as you do. But the God we worship to-day is a God of peace. We have learned that He is our Father, and that we are brothers. He has called us to-day to eat this meal together with Him. And when people eat together they are friends, not enemies. So let us thank the Lord Jesus Christ who has turned our enemies into friends, and taken away the fear of each other from our hearts.'²

War.

'If war is inevitable,' said Mr. Frank Roscoe, Secretary of the Royal Society of Teachers, in a vacation course lecture in London, 'let us arrange that in the next war the minimum age for enlistment is fifty. Let us appoint as chaplains some of the Bishops who are so fond of talking of war from time to time.'

'While we over fifty advance on the foe the young men can stay at home and make speeches of this kind: "I have already lost a father-in-law and two uncles. I am prepared to sacrifice another uncle rather than see the hated enemy triumph." These aged gentlemen would then totter into battle. The first issue of lumbago belts to the troops on the first cold winter's night in the trenches, when their grandmothers would be sending them hot-water bottles, would bring the armistice. The merit of that kind of war is that instead of killing off the flower of the generation, the old men would bear the brunt, and people like myself will not have to go through the rest of their lives thinking sadly of the promising lads they taught who were no more with them.'

² *Ibid.* 216.

¹ C. P. Groves, *Jesus Christ and Primitive Need*, 196.